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Taxi violence is a fundamental challenge in South Africa. Most disturbing is the prevalence of 
innocent passengers, including children, who become the victims of this form of violence. The 
main aim of this study was to investigate the transition of taxi violence in a new democratic South 
Africa and to suggest ways in which the country should deal with the issue of taxi violence. The 
study argues that issues around taxi routes, rank space, the poaching of passengers from one taxi 
association by another, as well as greed, remain major contributing factors to ongoing taxi 
conflicts. This thesis presents a comprehensive interpretation of the transition of the minibus-taxi 
industry over various periods and the conflicts and violence that have overwhelmed it since the 
advent of the minibus-taxi industry. In an attempt to comprehensively understand the growth, the 
developments, as well as the fundamental issues affecting taxi violence, a comprehensive historical 
overview of the minibus-taxi industry and the challenges that have plagued it is presented. The 
overview covers significant sequential periods, namely 1977-1987; 1987-1994; 1994-1999; and 
1999 to date. The research study thus focused on the transition and development of the minibus-
taxi industry and its related violent conflicts within the years of apartheid and since its demise. 
An analysis of the apartheid Government’s efforts to resolve the conflicts and complications in the 
minibus-taxi industry is followed by an investigation of the new democratic Government’s 
attempts to implement various strategies that would remedy the situation. Such strategies have 
seen the transformation, formalization as well as the deregulation of the taxi industry in South 
Africa. Particular foci of the investigation were the nature of and the connection that existed among 
taxi violence, taxi owners and law enforcement agencies. Therefore, in addition to a 
comprehensive literature review, interviews were conducted with fifteen taxi drivers in an attempt 
to illuminate the current causes of taxi violence from taxi drivers’ perspective. It was envisaged 
that the interviews would offer in-depth insights into the respondents’ opinions and perceptions of 
current issues relating to taxi violence in the minibus-taxi industry. 
This qualitative data collection method utilised semi-structured interviews. The interview schedule 
contained both open-ended and close-ended questions. The findings were analysed by means of a 
thematic analysis process which was utilized as a means of making sense of the data by extracting 
various emerging themes. Two significant theories underpinned this study, namely the conflict 
theory and the labeling theory. The findings revealed that, despite the demise of apartheid, taxi 
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violence still remains a major challenge in the South African minibus-taxi industry. The research 
study was conducted in Mpumalanga township, which is a low-urban community settlement in the 
eThekwini Municipality in the KwaZulu-Natal province. The interview data corroborated the 
findings of previous studies as it was found that perpetrators of taxi violence are predominantly 
taxi owners who contest ‘ownership’ of lucrative routes.  
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Taxi violence is by no means a new phenomenon in South Africa (Harris, 2003). Our country is 
no stranger to bloody clashes between rival taxi organizations who fight to gain dominance over 
lucrative routes. Even after the demise of apartheid in South Africa, violence remains a major 
challenge. This country is in the unfortunate position of being “one of the most violent countries 
in the world, with exposure to brutal violence being a daily experience for many adults and young 
children” (Zissis, Ensink & Robertson, 2000:152). Sadly, children and women are regularly 
involved as innocent victims of taxi violence. 
 Our country is a ‘post-conflict’ society, yet taxi violence and open ‘taxi wars’ occur on a regular 
basis. This is a phenomenon that Keegen (2005:66) explains as follows: “Conflicts create problems 
that outlast the signing of peace agreements. Conflicts change socio-cultural behavior, which 
cannot simply revert to pre-war patterns after peace has been restored”. According to the World 
Organization Against Torture (WOAT, 2006:16), the apartheid epoch left an overwhelming legacy 
of “the formation of a culture of violence”. In this context, Keegan (2005) argues that, as a nation, 
“we need to seriously consider the massage of the cultural factors that prompt certain individuals 
to engage in criminal activities.”  Furthermore, Amnesty International and Oxfam (2003), cited in 
Keegan (2005:66), state that “weapons outline conflict, and their presence creates a continuous 
risk that will be used in future criminal dealings”. South Africa is a country in transition and Shaw 
(2002) found that “countries in transition to democracy tend to experience increasing crime. This 
is because, as oppressive systems of policing and the ideologies that underpin authoritarian rule 
give away, gaps are created where criminal activity can flourish” (Shaw, 2002 cited in Keegan, 
2005:66). 
Over the last decade, incidents of taxi violence have escalated and this has contributed to the 
growing number of traumatic experiences faced by South Africans. Taxi conflicts are usually 
“characterized by gun battles among two or more taxi companies over territorial disputes”. 
(Human Rights Committee of South Africa, 1996 cited in Zissis et al., 2000:152  
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According to Dugard (2001 cited in WOAT, 2006:16), “violent taxi associations called ‘mother 
bodies’ are behind most of the violence that has come to be associated with the industry”. The 
Commission on taxi violence conducted an investigation on issues relating to taxi violence in the 
Western Cape. The findings were published on the 12th of September 2005 and, based on these 
findings, the commission reported that the taxi industry was managed in mafia style, that a culture 
of lawlessness existed in this industry, and that “hit men reigned supreme and a licensing body 
filled with corruption was of great concern” at that time (Commission on Taxi Violence, 1996 
cited in WOAT, 2000:16).  
Victims of this form of crime not only include drivers and their employees, but also passengers of 
minibus taxis and innocent passersby. The South African police in their 1996/7 annual plan 
acknowledged taxi violence as a priority crime that demanded crucial and methodical attention. 
However, taxi violence has continued unabated (Zessing et al., 2000:152). Jefthas (2002) proposes 
that ‘the inconsistencies and unreliability of the SAPS are particularly disheartening’ when 
considering the sad reality that certain communities, such as the one in Mpumalanga township, 
that have been inundated by taxi violence for years, heavily depend on this mode of transportation 
on a daily bases. “It seems that the South African population, and in particular those from 
impoverished communities, have no choice but to accommodate increasing levels of violence” 
(Zessis et al., 2000:152). 
Zessis, Ensink and Robertson (2000) conducted a study to investigate taxi violence and distress 
symptoms among the youth in Khayelitsha. Respondents in this study reported high levels of 
personal exposure to taxi violence. “Three hundred and ninety eight (79%) had heard shooting 
while at a taxi rank and 231 (46%) had witnessed a man being shot at a taxi rank. In addition, fifty 
eight (12%) reported being at a taxi rank when people were shot at, and seventeen (3%) reported 
having travelled in a taxi that was shot at” (Zessis et al., 2000:155). According to these authors, 
“the social, economic and emotional magnitude of volatile violence, such as taxi violence, is very 
serious, particularly in impoverished communities where conditions are conducive to a further 
escalation in violence and trauma” (Zessis et al., 2000:152). Furthermore, WOAT (2000) 
propagates that the high level of violent crime for most South Africans, predominantly the 
impoverished, is not a recent phenomenon. This organization further argued, “extreme levels of 
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inequality and decades of political conflict produced a society prone to violent crime” (WOAT, 
2000:9). 
 
1.2 Background to the study 
 
Violence, particularly taxi violence, is an ongoing and protuberant feature of South African society 
as this is a country in the process of developing from violence and an authoritarian rule. As a result, 
violence “constantly undermines and prevents efforts at reconciliation, healing and building 
sustainable peace” (Harris, 2002). During the 1980s, violence was socially sanctioned as a means 
of solving problems in South Africa (Simpson & Rouch, 1992). By the 1990s, the term ‘culture of 
violence’ was commonly used to “describe the conflict that enveloped South African society” 
(Hamber, 1998:3). As a consequence, the infiltrating disposition of the violence in South Africa 
“sabotaged the moral, interpersonal and social fabric” of society (Hamber, 1998: page.). The 
period from 1990 to 1994 in South Africa was characterized by extraordinary inter- and intra-
community violence. Simpson and Rouch (1992 cited in Hamber, 2002:3) argue that this violence 
“was facilitated by the deregulation of the overly repressive forms of social control that had 
characterized the apartheid state.” The form and nature of violence intensified as the negotiated 
transition began in February 1990. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, (2005: 1572) transition is defined as “a passage or 
change from one state or action or subject or set of circumstances to another”. Harris (2002) argues 
that, as a result of evolving circumstances, the South African society is in a permanent state of 
transition and change. 
Taxi violence has transitioned from what and how it used to be over the years. Back in the apartheid 
era, incidents of taxi-related violence were very few; in fact, they were less criminal in nature and 
were often linked to political violence (Dugard, 2001). Political violence according to the Oxford 
English Dictionary, (2005:1092) is defined as “hostile or aggressive acts motivated by a desire to 
affect change in the government”.  At the present time, violent incidents associated with the taxi 
industry are more prevalent, more regionalized, and more complex and are often associated with 
criminal violence. Violent crime according to the Oxford English Dictionary, (2005:1625) is 
defined as “ criminal acts that use force to harm or attack” In South Africa in particular, minibus 
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taxis are an important part of any functioning community. They provide point-to-point services to 
the public and have made the lives of commuters, who have no other means of transport, much 
easier. The taxi industry is therefore regarded as a significant role player in introducing people of 
African descent into the mainstream economy; hence the minibus taxi industry has become an 
esteemed ‘flagship’ for Black economic empowerment. However, the South African informal 
transport industry, which has been dubbed the ‘minibus taxi industry’, is infamous for its frequent 
spurts of deadly confrontations that are commonly referred to as ‘taxi wars’ or ‘taxi violence’.  
The existence of the modern minibus taxi industry was inherited from the apartheid regime. This 
industry developed and bloomed in the late 1970s as there was a great need for transportation due 
to the segregation laws of the apartheid Government. People migrated from rural areas to the cities 
in their hundreds of thousands in search of a better life and employment opportunities as most of 
the country’s economic sectors were located within inner city environments. The need for 
convenient transportation escalated as state owned buses and trains were costly. Moreover, the 
drop-off points were only at bus and train stations which forced the commuters to walk long 
distances to and from their homes, thus making them vulnerable targets to victimization. 
Entrepreneurs among these commuters began to develop their own private bus and taxi companies 
in response to this great need for transportation. This they did without any financial assistance in 
the form of subsidies from the Government. However, the Government tried to prevent these 
operations by implementing laws that prevented Black people from operating minibus taxis (KZN 
Minister of Transport, 2000). Black users of this form of transport were ruthlessly harassed by the 
apartheid Government who forcefully wanted all people of African descent to use rail and state 
subsidized bus transport (KZN Minister of Transport, 2000). The apartheid Government did this 
as a way to prevent Africans from owning as well as running their own businesses. However, 
despite the many challenges the minibus taxi industry faced, it still flourished. The minibus taxi 
industry was subjected to a number of investigations, but it was only in 1986 that the Government 
made it legal to operate 16-seater taxis. However, the number of operating permits was limited. 
By the end of 1989, about 50 000 minibus taxis were operating nationally. 
Soon after the Government made it legal to operate 16-seater taxis in 1986, new problems started 
to emerge. According to the KZN Minister of Transport (2004:4), these included the following: 
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- The minibus taxi industry was not part of the country’s formal economic system and 
suffered from a variety of organizational weaknesses and lack of future prosperity 
consequent upon this; 
- The industry was not properly regulated; 
- It was structurally positioned outside of formal fiscal reporting; 
- It was in a conflicting economic relationship with other service providers in the public 
transport system; 
- It had major economic problems; 
- Instability in the industry lead to violent conflicts; 
- It was poorly and undemocratically organized.  
 
The biggest challenge the minibus taxi industry is still faced with is the issue of taxi conflicts that 
erupt as a result of various issues within the taxi industry. Lomme (n.d.) propagates that taxi 
conflicts have to be considered in the broader context of a very high level of social violence. On 
1st September 2016, the police Minister Nathi Nhleko releaed the crime statistics for the period 
April 2015- March 2016. Here, the Minister claimed that… 
The country seems to be moving back to the high levels of murder witnessed in the 
2016 period. 18 673 murders were committed in the 2015/2016 period, which 
means an increase from roughly 33 murders per 100 000 in 2012 to 34 per 100 000 
in 2016. It equates to 51 people murdered in South Africa every day during this 
period, as opposed to 49 in 2014/2015. The global average is 6.2 per 100 000. A 
high percentage (59%) of murders was committed indoors, very often amongst 
people known to each other, and often linked to domestic violence and/or the use 
of alcohol. 
Furthermore, the Minister spoke of crime in this category as being ‘quite stubborn’.Anine Kriegler 
and Mark Shaw (2015), conducted a study on violence and crime. In this study, they pointed out 
to inequality as a chief cause of anger, frustration, violence and antisocial behavior. They postulate:  
You find the same situations arising in new democracies around the world. 
Wherever there is inequality, you find this happening. In South Africa, the only 
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way to fix this is to have a huge scale, nationwide programme to create jobs, and 
create job access by legitimate means. 
In August 1993, the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry issued a preliminary report on issues related 
to taxi violence. Listed in the committee’s report were “intolerance, selfishness, provocation and 
greed by taxi operators” as the immediate causes of taxi violence. However, the report stated that 
political rivalry and affiliation were not causes of taxi violence (Camay & Gordon, 2002:16), but 
it mentioned various other causal factors for taxi conflicts. These included 
 “the effects of apartheid laws on urbanization, the failure of authorities to provide 
even rudimentary transportation for masses of people on a daily basis, commercial 
factors, the Department of Transport’s lack of transparency in the issuing of 
permits, the lack of law enforcement, and the absence of facilities” (Business Day, 
1993, August 20 cited in Camay & Gordon, 2002:16).  
Furthermore, the Goldstone Committee of Inquiry (2005) argued that taxi wars were also stirred 
by “damaging inconsistencies in transport planning”. Another issue was the lack of law 
enforcement against those who infringed on already overtraded routes. A particular problem was 
the ‘pirates’, who were minibus taxi operators running without the required permit to operate as a 
public transport operator or who were serving a particular route without having been awarded the 
operating license necessary to do so. The lack of law enforcement (which indeed resulted from the 
fierce resistance by taxi operators to police control) was by far not the only flaw in urban transport 
policy that fueled violence in the minibus taxi industry. 
 For example, “fateful inadequacies in the award of operating licenses without 
regard for the demand for public transport were also incriminated for the deadly 
confrontations between competing taxi operators” (Goldstone Committee of 
Inquiry, 2005 cited in Camay & Gordon, 2002:16). 
This research argues that violence is by no means a new phenomenon in South Africa and has by 
no means been eradicated. The country’s state of violence has been interwoven around transition 
politics and, subsequent to the political negotiations in the early 1990s, there has been a drastic 
increase rather than decreasing levels in structural violence. “Structural violence and economic 
impoverishment were achieved through racially-based inequalities in resources and opportunities 
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coupled with repression, politicized housing, education, jobs, wages and the delivery of services” 
(Hamber, 1998:3). 
Taxi violence in the South African taxi industry has been identified as a major issue that stands in 
the way of this industry’s success. Issues such as taxi routes, rank space, poaching of passengers 




The Black South African minibus taxi industry is regarded as a “flagship of Black economic 
empowerment” (KZN Minister of Transport, 2000:3). According to Boudreaux (2006), this 
industry serves about 65% of South Africans who use public transportation and it is a source of 
Black entrepreneurial activity. However, this industry is plagued by a legacy of illegality as a result 
of apartheid laws which restricted all possible economic opportunities for Black people of African 
descent. 
Boudreaux (2006:1) postulates that “South Africa’s transportation landscape is a legacy of 
apartheid”. Apartheid laws such as the infamous Group Areas Act forcibly removed all Africans 
from the inner city centers to surrounding townships and rural homelands. The modes of 
transportation provided by the National Party Government caused a number of complications for 
Black South Africans. For example, “transportation choices were limited, there were few taxis, 
and buses and trains were convenient”. Even worse, public transport vehicles were regularly 
patrolled by the South African Police in search of people travelling without the required ‘pass’ 
(Boudreaux, 2006:1). Some Black entrepreneurs saw a great opportunity presented indirectly 
before their eyes to meet the consumer demand for a more accessible and convenient mode of 
transportation. Boudreaux offers the following comments: 
“Today the taxi/minibus industry is credited with supporting Black South 
African communities by providing a depoliticized, decentralized, 
inexpensive, and more accessible alternative to public transportation. This 
industry empowered Black South Africans at a time when very few 
opportunities for economic empowerment existed. Currently, the industry 
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provides a strong example of enterprise serving as a platform for fighting 
discriminatory Government policies for job creation and for poverty 
alleviation” (Boudreaux, 2006:1.). 
However, despite the fact that the taxi industry has triumphed against all the forms of oppression 
it faced, the industry still struggles with a number of weaknesses such as “safety problems and 
persistent bouts of violence” (Boudreaux, 2006:1). These weaknesses prevent the ideal benefits 
the minibus taxi industry could offer to commuters and also to the country’s economic 
development. Boudreaux’s point of exodus regarding the issue of taxi violence is that:  
“For this business to continue, its important role as a strategic source of poverty 
alleviation and the issues surrounding safety and violence must be addressed.” 
(Boudreaux, 2006:1).   
It is against this background that this research attempted to investigate the transition of taxi 
violence. 
Barrett (2003), who states that taxi violence is instigated when “battles flare up between 
associations of owners who fight over taxi routes, rank spaces and the poaching of commuters.” 
This still remains a fundamental challenge today, as virtually every rural and urban area in South 
Africa has experienced taxi wars.  
The researcher’s personal experiences of taxi violence include being left stranded and having to 
miss lectures due to the fact that taxis do not operate when violent conflicts erupt. The researcher’s 
experiences include hearing gun shots being fired in the nearby Mpumalanga taxi rank and hearing 
stories about drivers, commuters and bystanders who got shot as a result of stray bullets. The 
researchers own experiences of taxi violence as a community member in Mpumalanga township 
therefore prompted the choice of this particular research topic.  
The researcher’s background as a township resident commanded her to consider the fact that the 
current situation the South African taxi industry is now more about shooting and less about sitting 
down and negotiating. The incidents of violent conflicts as well as the number of casualties have 
drastically escalated compared to the 1990s (KZN Minister of Transport, 2000). It is for this reason 
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that the researcher was motivated to investigate the transition of taxi violence in a democratic 
dispensation. 
 
1.4 Aim of the study 
 
The aim of this research study was to determine the realities pertaining to the transition of taxi 
violence through empirical research.  
 
1.5 Objectives of the study 
 
The objectives that emanated from the aims of the study were as follow: 
First, to describe and analyze the history of taxi violence in South Africa before and after the 1994 
democratic elections. Before the 1994 elections, the country was under the apartheid regime where 
all forms of violence, taxi violence in particular, were promoted as a way to keep the people of 
African descent further divided. The 1994 democratic elections gave the people of South Africa 
new hope; however, the levels of violent taxi practices have shown a drastic increase. 
Second, to investigate the developments and transition that have taken place in the Mpumalanga 
Taxi Association from 1994 to 2015. It was pivotal for this study to investigate the developments 
and transitions - if any - that had taken place in the Mpumalanga Taxi Association and to 
understand whether their impact was positive or negative.  
Third, to investigate the role of political parties and their influence on the perpetration of taxi 
violence. Violence in our country is often linked to transition politics, and therefore it was 
imperative to investigate the role played by political parties in taxi violence. 
Fourth, to find out if issues such as taxi routes, rank space, poaching of passengers, poverty, low 
salaries and greed all acted as a vehicle for ongoing taxi wars. Numerous factors have been 
identified as the cause of many deaths and injuries in the South African taxi industry. Greed has 
been ranked as the highest causal factor for taxi-related conflicts, followed by conflict over taxi 
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routes and the poaching of passengers. It was thus important to find out from the drivers of minibus 
taxis themselves if such issues played a role or if, perhaps, there were other underlying factors that 
had yet to be discovered about the causes of taxi violence.  
 
1.6 Key research questions 
 
The critical questions that directed this study were: 
• What is the history of the taxi violence in South Africa before and after the 1994 democratic 
elections? Historical interpretations of taxi violence before and after the 1994 democratic elections 
vary. Some consider the nature of taxi violence before 1994 to be less criminal in nature than it 
became after the 1994 elections. Therefore, this research aimed to find out what the perceptions of 
drivers of minibus taxis were regarding the history of taxi violence. 
• Have there been any developments or transitions in the Mpumalanga Taxi Association from 1994 
to 2015? Developments and transitions often take place to make the lives of the people in a specific 
area much easier and more comfortable. Change, whether good or bad, has an underlying impact 
on the people it is aimed to reach. Here the aim was to find out from taxi drivers if they had seen 
any developments in the Mpumalanga Taxi Association. 
• Do political parties in any way influence the perpetration of taxi violence? Perpetrators of taxi 
violence are known by both the community as well as role players in the taxi industry. However, 
because the history of taxi violence in South Africa is closely linked to transition politics, it was 
of great significance to investigate and gain a concrete understanding of the role political parties 
play in perpetuating taxi violence. 
• Do issues such as taxi routes, rank space, poaching of passengers, poverty, low salaries and 
greed all act as a vehicle for the ongoing taxi wars? Every violent conflict takes place as a result 
of a certain underlying factor. In the South African taxi industry, the same issues have been 
identified to be the cause of taxi-related conflicts. Therefore, this research study sought to 
determine if the above mentioned issues were also contributing factors of taxi violence in 
Mpumalanga township.   
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1.7 Chapter sequence 
 
CHAPTER 1: This chapter provides the introduction to and background of the study. It briefly 
introduces the problem statement, the aims and objectives of the research, and the main research 
questions. 
CHAPTER 2: This chapter provides a preliminary review of the historical development of the 
kombi taxi/minibus industry, the root causes of taxi violence, and how the industry has transitioned 
in democratic South Africa.  
CHAPTER 3: This chapter provides a description of the research design and the methods that 
were used to execute the study. It presents a description of the research site, the population sample, 
and the data collection techniques. The significance of the study is also addressed in this chapter.  
CHAPTER 4: This chapter presents the data that were collected as well as a discussion of the 
findings based on the analyses of the data. These processes were underpinned by two theoretical 
frameworks, namely the conflict theory and the labeling theory that served as principal theories of 
the study. The discussion focuses on the transition of taxi violence and the impact taxi violence 
has on commuters as well as taxi owners and operators. A further exploration of the findings is 
presented in order to find a workable solution that may be implemented by policy and decision 
makers. 
CHAPTER 5:  This chapter presents the discussion and analysis of the findings obtained from 
semi-structured open-ended interviews. The themes that emerged after reading the transcript are 
also further discussed.   
CHAPTER 6: This chapter provides the recommendations that emanated from the study. It is 
envisaged that the implementation of these suggestions will be applied to address the issue of taxi 





This chapter provided an overall outline of the study. The discussion centred on the core of the 
dissertation as articulated through the background, the aim, and the objectives of the study. The 
following chapter comprises a literature review as well as a brief reference to the theoretical 
framework within which the study was located. A more comprehensive discussion of the focus of 



















This chapter provides a review of previous research relevant to the aim and objectives of the 
current study. The transition of taxi violence is discussed by looking at available studies dealing 
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with the same topic that had been conducted both nationally and internationally. Boote and Baile 
(2005) believe that a researcher or student “needs to have an understanding of what has been done 
before, what the strengths and weaknesses of other existing studies were, and what these strengths 
and weaknesses might mean”. According to Cooper (1998 cited in Mkhize, 2012:17), one chief 
purpose of the literature review is to essentially describe, summarize, evaluate, clarify and/or 
assimilate the content of primary reports. Boote and Baile (2005) assert that “the literature review 
goes beyond the search for information and includes the identification and articulation of 
relationships between the literature and your [the researcher’s] field of research” (Boote & Baile, 
2005:3). The inability to understand what has been done before puts any researcher at a great 
disadvantage; therefore, the literature review is generally targeted at gaining detailed knowledge 
of the topic being studied. 
The chief aim of this chapter is to give a description of the historical development of the South 
African minibus taxi industry. The rise of the South African taxi industry is comprehensively 
discussed and it covers three phases of the development until the present time. Further to that, the 
root causes of taxi violence, with the view to tracing the reasons why such violence continues to 
trouble this industry, are also indicated. Finally, the introduction and implementation of the Taxi 
Recapitalization Program will be discussed as the one most influential policy that needs to be 
implemented for the purpose of ending taxi violence and providing a ‘safe and improved’ public 





2.2 Conceptualization of terms 
Terms such as violence, taxi wars and minibus/kombi taxi will be used interchangeably in this 





The World Health Organization cited in (Abrahams, 2010:495) defines violence as “the intentional 
use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a 
group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, 
psychological harm, mal-development, or deprivation.  
 
2.2.2 Taxi wars 
The term ‘taxi wars’ is also referred to as ‘turfs wars’ which involve fighting between associations 
and individual minibus taxi operators in South Africa. This conflict started in the late 1980s and 
has continued almost unabated to date. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘Turf wars’ 
is an idiomatic term for a “bitter struggle for territory, power, control and rights” (2005: 1590). 
Two types of taxi violence have been identified, namely, structural violence and criminal violence: 
a) Structural violence 
According to the submission by the KwaZulu-Natal Minister of Transport (KZNMT, 2000:5), 
structural violence relates to taxi conflicts emanating from route contestations and intra-association 
differences caused by a lack of democratic practices within associations. The Minister further 
explains that such conflicts “are managed and dealt with through the structures and mediation 
procedures developed as part of the interim Minibus Taxi Act, no. 2 of 1998”. 
b) Criminal violence 
This term is used to describe activities within the taxi industry that are identified as having 
‘criminal characteristics’. The KwaZulu-Natal Minister of Transport (KZNMT, 2000:5) stated that 
the taxi industry was rife with elements involved in criminal activities. The minister added that 
“these elements are well-resourced and instill fear in other operators. They are running mafia-type 
operations. Financial extortion is the order of the day.” 
 
2.2.3 Minibus taxi/Kombi taxi 
Moyake (2006) defines a kombi taxi as a small bus, typically used for short to long distances, with 
a fixed number of passengers. Baloyi (2009:12) defines a minibus taxi as “a motor vehicle which 
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plies hire and is operated for commercial gain.” According to Sylvia (1996:717), “this mode of 
transport is often identified with words such as ‘Black taxi, kombi taxi, minibus taxi’ to distinguish 
this type of vehicle from a metered taxi”. The kombi taxi is a light vehicle, usually a sixteen-seater 
minibus, which transports passengers on a fixed route for a fixed fare (as do buses and trains), but 
this mode of transportation does not operate on a timetable (Moyake, 2006). 
 
2.3 History of the taxi industry in South Africa 
South Africa is a country that is coming from a past shaped by violence and repression. The country 
faces new challenges with the slow maturation of democracy. Today, violence is complex and 
creative in form and is shaped by both apartheid and the mechanisms of transition itself (Dugard, 
2001).  
The history of the taxi industry in South Africa is closely linked to the country’s history of 
apartheid. In the 1960s, the apartheid regime’s policies caused Black people of African descent to 
receive limited resources with limited access to business opportunities. During those days it was 
difficult, indeed almost impossible, for a Black person to obtain a permit allowing him to operate 
in the transport industry. The very few individuals who did obtain permits to operate used only 
sedan cars. According to Ingle (2009), taxi operations were restricted to sedan motor vehicles 
equipped with fare meters. This was because roving taxis that could be waved down were not 
allowed. 
Gradually, however, sedan motors were replaced by minibus vehicles as the numbers of passengers 
requiring this form of transport increased drastically, particularly in urban and peri-urban areas. In 
this context, the Railway Association of South Africa (2009 cited in Ingle 2009:72) states that “the 
use of meters [i.e., metered sedan vehicles] fell away, as did official efforts at enforcing the 
prescribed areas to which minibus taxis were confined in terms of their working permits. Strictly 
speaking, the term ‘taxi’ is no longer appropriate to this mode of passenger transport, which is 
listed elsewhere in the world under the heading of minibus operation or para-transit.” 
An investigation by the International Labor [sic] Organization (ILO) (2003) found that public 
transport in South Africa was completely dominated and ruled by the Government which owned 
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the railways and bus companies. The bus companies received support from the Government in the 
form of subsidies. The subsidized bus industry included both publicly and privately-owned buses.  
During the 1960s, people of African descent desperately needed public transportation more than 
other groups. This was because of two key reasons: (1) The majority of African people were and 
still are too poor to afford private motor vehicles; (2) Due to forced removals, Black people were 
relocated to township (urban) and homeland (rural) areas by the apartheid Government. These 
areas were isolated and far from commercial and industrial centers (ILO, 2003). This was done to 
keep the people of different racial groups segragated. 
The taxi industry in South Africa initially started in the late 1970s in response to the high demand 
for public transportation. However, Khosa (2001:23) notes that “the phenomenon of Black taxis 
can be traced to the turn of the eighteenth century. The predecessors of the modern Black taxis 
were horse-drawn cabs which emerged in the 1800s”. The transport provided by buses and trains 
started to become increasingly expensive; hence the taxi industry was aimed at catering for the 
needs of the Black community who was poor and could not afford to pay high train and bus fares. 
The state was against the taxi industry and immediately acted to protect the existing public 
transport system and prevent Black entrepreneurs from operating taxis (Dugard, 2001). The 
Government gained control over this matter by refusing to give taxi operators permission to legally 
operate on the roads. This resulted in many taxi operators working illegally without permits. 
At the end 1979, this new body of entrepreneurs who wanted to operate legally found a loophole 
in the Road Transportation Act 74 of 1977. According to this Act, any vehicle carrying ten 
passengers or more for financial gain was deemed by legislation to be a bus and was therefore 
subject to certain controls (Barrett 2003). Ingenious taxi operators using vehicles that carried ten 
passengers then simply left one seat empty.  
Due to the unequal distribution of resources, the Black community kept getting poorer and could 
not afford private motor cars. This resulted in an even higher demand for public transportation. 
Many taxi operators decided to operate illegally. They faced a lot of consequences such as having 
to pay fines or having their taxis confiscated (Barrett 2003). In many instances taxi ranks were 
closed by local governments. Pressure mounted as both the White and Black communities wanted 
minibus taxis to operate freely on South African roads. Black commuters wanted cheaper and more 
efficient transportation that would pick them up and drop them in their residential and work areas. 
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Buses and trains only made stops at stations and bus stops. This forced Black commuters to walk 
long distances before they got to their destinations. Employers, who were predominantly White, 
wanted their employees to be able to travel easily and at cheaper prices so they would not miss 
work which would, in turn, increase productivity.   
The South African kombi taxi industry went through numerous investigations in 1983 by different 
Government structures so that a conclusion could be drawn on whether to allow the kombi taxis 
to operate or not. The Welgemoed Commission was among the many bodies of investigators who 
studied the taxi industry. It made the recommendation that the kombi taxis should be made illegal 
and that this should be achieved by ending the loophole that existed by granting no more permits 
to operators. This Commission’s report resulted in numerous debates. A separate Government 
structure also studied the kombi taxi industry and published its findings in what is known as the 
National Transport Policy (1992). This Policy proposed that 16-seater minibus taxis be made legal 
to operate as taxis but that the the number of permits be limited. The local authorities did this by 
setting quotas and issuing strict new permits. The Competition Board, which was another 
Government structure that investigated the kombi taxi industry, strongly disagreed with the quota 
system. It argued that instead, the industry should run freely. Finally, in 1986, the South African 
Government legalized the 16-seaters for taxi use. These minibuses were required to carry no more 
than 15 passengers. In 1989, about 50 000 minibus taxis were operating throughout South Africa 
with a highest number of the commuter market when compared to buses and trains. However, the 
number of permits was still restricted. 
In the 1950s, laws such as the Group Areas Act 17 of 1950 and the Land Act of 1954 both acted 
as a driving force for keeping South Africans separated. The Group Areas Act assigned different 
races to different residential areas and business sections in urban areas. Mpumalanga township is 
a perfect example of the Group Areas Act and how power was exercised among a minority group. 
Mosoetsa (2005) points out the following: “During the 1970s and 1980s, many Black people of 
African descent were forced off their land and relocated to homelands. Between 1948 and 1982, 
in Natal alone, about 745 000 people were forcibly removed from their land.” Haart (2002) further 
contends that “space was strategically controlled through forced removals and relocations from 
the land, the creation of townships and homelands, and the establishment of industrial zones.” 
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Ackerman and Duvall (2001:5) argue that the apartheid system’s weakness was that the prosperity 
of White South Africans depended upon the labour of Black Africans. Mosoetsa (2004:2) notes 
that “Mpumalanga township was established as a typical apartheid labour reserve. The township 
provided labour to neighboring industries in Pietermaritzburg, Pinetown and Durban.” The 
Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), which was behind the establishment of Hammersdale 
which is a clothing and textile zone, argued at the time that a well-established textile industry 
would offer tremendous employment opportunities for semiskilled workers, which meant that it 
could raise the standard of living of the ‘Bantu’ people (IDC: 197). However, the IDC was too 
ambitious in its argument as the standard of living of the people in Mpumalanga township was, 
and is to this day, of a very low standard. 
 
2.4 The root causes of taxi violence 
The year 1990 not only symbolizes the year that Nelson Mandela was released from prison, but it 
also marks the year that South Africa experienced its most severe taxi violence to date. The owners 
of various taxi associations fought over taxi routes, which resulted in uncontrollable violent 
conflicts that caused the deaths of hundreds or even thousands of owners, drivers and commuters. 
McCaul (1990:44) highlights that the root cause of many battles in the taxi industry was financial 
gain. Moreover, according to Dugard (2001), the apartheid taxi violence was closely linked to 
transition politics. In this context, the main root causes are seen to be the rapid deregulation of 
transport, rank space, poaching of passengers, and undercutting of prices, which lead to the growth 
of many taxi associations (Khosa, 1992). This then gave rise to violent conflicts between 
associations of taxi owners fighting for commuter routes. During the period of the taxi wars, the 
industry was faced with many challenges. One particular challenge was that there were very few 
other fruitful opportunities for Black entrepreneurs. For this reason, too many of them wanted to 
be part of the taxi industry. According to Moyake (2006), the tightening of profit margins as a 
result of deregulation further intensified conflicts in this industry during the taxi war years. This 
author revealed that it was not really during peak hours that the effect of new entrants was felt, but 
particularly during off-peak hours when demand was low, which largely affected the profitability 
of established operators. 
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Moreover, only a limited number of permits were issued to taxi operators following the so-called 
quota system. It became very difficult for many aspiring taxi drivers to obtain permits and, because 
of this, they started to operate their taxi enterprises illegally. Bribery and corruption became the 
norm among taxi owners who were also police officials. According to Barrett (2003), many law 
breakers were traffic officers and traffic department officials such as those accepting bribes instead 
of legal payment for fines. It is alleged that, even today, traffic officers are still the ‘worst 
offenders’ when it comes to accepting bribes. However, traffic officials were not the only culprits, 
as evidence showed that prosecutors and other court officials were also involved in incidences of 
bribery. (Barrett, 2003). The involvement of law enforcement agencies in illegal acts hindered and 
still continues to hinder Government’s efforts to fight against taxi wars.  
Majeke (2003:18) states that police officials tried but failed to stop this violence; as a result, it 
intensified. People started to believe that it was the Government’s way of further fractionalizing 
society to ensure that they would stay ‘apart’ and not come together to fight the policies of that 
time. According to Barrett (2003), from the late 1980s onwards, certain areas became more taxi 
violent ‘hotspots’ when compared to others. Victims of this crime phenomenon were usually 
operators and commuters, but owners of taxis were also known to be crime victims. 
 
 
2.5 The impact of the political unrest on the minibus taxi industry  
South African is a country with a history of political violence that claimed the lives of many people. 
Violence in our country is marked by different behaviours. According to Abraham (2010:495), 
political violence can also be seen as ‘collective violence’. The World Health Organization cited 
in (Abrahams, 2010:496) defines collective violence as: 
 “The instrumental use of violence by people who identify themselves as members 
of a group - whether this group is transitionary or has a more permanent identity - 
against another group or a set of individuals, in order to achieve political, 
economic or social objectives.” 
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Duncan (2005) states that, between 1990 and 1994, the country experienced a number of conflicts 
in African residential areas, especially in African townships such as those on the Cape Flats and 
in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng. Political analysts of that time viewed the violence as being “Black 
on Black” (Abraham, 2010). 
When looking at the development of political violence, Kynoch (2000 cited in Abrahams, 
2010:500) writes: “The protests of the 1980s, together with the fighting between the ANC and IFP, 
turned many Black townships into war zones. The forms of violence that took place between 1980 
and 1994 always claimed innocent people’s lives, including [those of] children.” The situation was 
dire in KwaZulu-Natal, where one area that experienced the most severe political violence was 
Mpumalanga township (Abraham, 2010). 
This township has always had a high number of Inkatha Freedom Party followers. The 1980s were 
characterized by the clashes between the followers of the IFP, ANC in UDF. These three political 
parties have never seen eye to eye, even to the present day (Abraham, 2010). (Since then, the UDF 
has been affiliated with the ANC. The last UDF meeting was held on 14 August 1991.) The 
situation intensified in Mpumalanga township in 1987. Township conflicts, politically motivated 
crime and violence escalated. People lost their lives, family life was disrupted, houses were burnt 
down and schooling came to a standstill (Nzimande & Thusi, 1991). Areas were blockaded 
resulting in ‘no go areas’ and services such as the use of taxi routes were disrupted as well. Taxi 
violence became increasingly widespread. Authorities were unable to manage the violence and 
efforts to restructure the taxi industry were slow (Abraham, 2010). In the midst of this, the 
deregulation and growth of the taxi industry took place during very violent times in which local 
taxi associations and the taxi industry became entangled. Abraham (2010) describes this conflict 
as follows: 
“Taxis that plied the long distance routes between KZN and Johannesburg 
were attacked for being pro-Inkatha. Similarly, taxis which transported 
migrant workers from Inkatha-dominated hostels on the reef were subject to 
numerous violent attacks from predominantly ANC supporting nearby 
communities. Taxi associations began to arm their drivers, and so cycles of 
attack and counter attacks were perpetrated until specific associations became 
affiliated with particular political movements.” 
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However, the conflicts were not resolved when South Africa became a true democracy, as 
Sekhonyane and Dugard (2004:15) state:  
“Contrary to many expectations, the cycle of fomenting taxi violence during the 
late apartheid period did not end with the demise of apartheid. Indeed, unlike 
other forms of political violence that diminished and disappeared after 1994, taxi 
violence actually escalated in the immediate post-1994 period.” 
 
2.6 Role players in the taxi industry 
According to Baloyi (2012), ‘taxi industry’ refers to the people engaged in a commercial enterprise 
involving taxis. Each industry has its own ‘trade publication’, which is the organized action of 
making of goods and services for sale (Gule, 2009). Thus, in the taxi industry there is a common 
‘language’ used or a way of communication that people use and understand to get to their 
destinations. According to Oosthuizen and Baloyi (2000:1), “passengers and drivers commonly 
use hand signals to communicate route and destination information.” They also revealed that 
passengers who grew up in a specific area understand these signals fairly well, but that visitors 
hardly know or understand the meaning of these hand signals. They state in a light-hearted vein 
that this “makes it difficult for visitors to use the minibus taxi services as they often end up getting 
lost”. 
For the purpose of this research study, it was of great importance to generate a comprehensive 
understanding of the role players or stakeholders in the taxi industry. Barrett (2003) states that 
there are approximately 180 000 workers in the kombi taxi industry. Employment relations tend 
to be precarious and, for most workers, no formal contract of employment exists. It is further 
argued that there are no national minimum labour standards and no standard formula for wage 
payment.  
Role players in this industry comprise of drivers or operators, queue marshals, vehicle washers 
and, in instances where taxis operate in and within township areas, fare collectors (Barrett, 2003). 
2.6.1 Taxi drivers 
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Taxi drivers form the majority group of workers in this industry. These drivers are usually not taxi 
owners but work for another individual and, according to Barrett (2003:9), they receive their 
income in four different ways:   
1. Some drivers receive no basic wage, but pay a fixed percentage of the week’s takings to 
the owner. 
2. Under the ‘wage/plus system’, the driver receives a basic wage and pays a portion of the 
takings to the owner, keeping the rest as income. 
3. A fairly common system is where all the takings are handed to the owner and the driver 
receives a regular wage. 
4. The driver may hand all takings to the owner, except the takings of a designated day in a 
week. 
Taxi owners claim that about 50% of the fare collected en route is stolen by drivers. They 
commonly make justifications about paying their drivers low salaries by arguing that drivers steal 
large amounts of money (SANTACO, 2001). 
 
2.6.2 Queue/taxi marshals 
According to Barrett (2003), queue or taxi marshals are employed by local taxi associations and 
are paid a fixed wage. Nelson (20l0:8) defines a queue/taxi marshal as “a person who arranges 
passengers and vehicle-related procedures at taxi facilities.” The term ‘taxi marshal’ originated in 
the USA, where the tradition of controlling traffic flow manually started. Taxi marshals have much 
wider responsibilities than just controlling the traffic flow. For example, they are mandated to 
ensure public safety by providing control over behaviour at taxi ranks (ibid.).  
 
2.7 What it takes to be a taxi driver 
Sauti (2006:3) writes that “no formal education is required to become a minibus taxi driver.” The 
highest level of education which is found amongst most minibus taxi operators is secondary school, 
although some have technical qualifications. A driver only needs to obtain a code 8 (light weight 
motor vehicle) driver’s license and a taxi permit if he/she owns his/her own taxi in order to 
23 
transport passengers. Sauti further states that a taxi owner is legally required to own a taxi permit 
which should be in the possession of the driver when transporting passengers (Sauti, 2006). 
 
2.8 Fiscal contribution of the minibus taxi industry 
Nkambule and Govender (2014) assert that during the apartheid era, the apartheid Government did 
not approve of the taxi industry. It viewed the industry as a risk and feared that it could cause a 
great loss to the country’s economy. The ruling Government of that time then made no efforts in 
establishing policies for the regulation of the industry. These two authors further propagate that 
the former apartheid Government did not see the need to invest in infrastructure that would allow 
for growth of the taxi industry to meet the transport needs of commuters who came from 
disadvantaged backgrounds. This oversight “resulted in the industry growing exponentially 
without any regulation of formalization plans in place” (Nkambule & Govender, 2014:185). 
The minibus taxi industry contributes close to 65% of all public transport in South Africa 
(Nkambule & Govender 2014). Walters (2007) provides the following statistics pertaining to 
minibus taxis: 
 Close to 14 million people use the services of minibus taxis each day;  
 There are about 120 000 formally registered taxis on South African roads;  
 There are usually 2 taxis per owner;    
 About 8.8 hours are spent daily by taxi operators on the roads;  
 Taxi operators usually work 6.33 days per week;  
 The normal monthly distance driven by a taxi driver is 8 000 kilometers;  
 On average, each vehicle transports about 3 161 passengers per month;  
 Each commuter spends about 65 minutes per day in a taxi, on average;  
 The number of trips an individual take using a taxi is estimated at 2.3 trips per day (Walters, 
2007). 
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Figures of the above-mentioned statistics have escalated dramatically in the last few years. Arrive 
alive (2016), which is a road safety awareness initiative, provides the following current statistics 
pertaining to the minibus industry: 
 The taxi industry consists of minibuses, dominating 90% of the market, and metered taxis 
active in the remaining 10% of the market 
 Public transport by taxis account for 65% of the transport total, 20% by bus and 15% by rail  
 The industry consists of approximately 150 000 public minibus taxis.  
 Of the 36 lives lost daily on our roads – 3 are killed in taxi related incidents  
 The South African taxi industry is estimated to have a turnover of more than R16,5 billion   
 The minibus taxi industry in South Africa is comprised of more than 20 000 owners and 200 
000 employ (Arrive alive, 2016). 
 In this context, Barrett (2003:11) argued that, as far back as 2003, despite the size and economic 
importance of the minibus taxi industry, “the total value of the industry, either in terms of 
contribution to the GDP or in terms of turnover, is not known in parts because most owners are 
not registered tax payers and their turnover is not recorded anywhere.” However, more recently 
SATAXI (2014) has refuted the above statement by claiming that “the taxi industry has created 
sustainable jobs for more than 400 000 people and has an estimated turnover of more than R16.5 
billion per year.” This implies that much more information is available about the taxi industry 
through more efficient regulation than in earlier years.    
The South African Taxi Industry (SATAXI, 2014:3) provides further illumination of the current 
minibus taxi industry in the following comment: 
“Taxi operators are also deeply woven into the cultural fabric of society. They are 
often the only means by which South Africans can gather for vital social and 
culturally important events such as community meetings, weddings, and funerals. 
In fact, taxi operators make South Africa’s democracy work – by getting people 
to voting stations. The taxi industry sustains thousands of other small businesses. 
Each operator brings additional customers to the satellite businesses, such as 
hawkers, car washers, and hairdressers that serve and are dependent on taxi ranks. 
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So, each operator helps create and maintain jobs within his own wider 
community”. 
This organization strongly believes that “each operator’s success positively impacts the quality of 
life of at least 15 people within and outside of his or her own family. The economic and social 
ripple effect of the taxi industry has the power to transform South Africa.” 
Nkambule and Govender (2014:186) support the above statement by arguing that “the road 
transport sector contributes 3.4% towards the GDP, of which the taxi industry is the major 
contributor and employs an estimated 200 000 employees in mainly lower semi-skilled 
categories.” With the country’s high level of poverty and unemployment, this informal sector plays 
an important role in contributing to the economy. According to Barrett (2003:2), “the precise racial 
breakdown of taxi ownership is unknown; but it is estimated at about 90% Black-owned, making 
the industry one of the biggest concentrations of Black-owned capital in the country.” 
Mashinini (2007) writes that from as early as the 1980s, taxi ranks have become economic centers 
for various kinds of informal businesses that have mostly benefited the disadvantaged Black 
communities. This is because it is at these sites that small entrepreneurs sell fruit, vegetables, 
takeaways, snacks, small appliances, and clothing items. 
 
 
2.8.1 High accident rate 
In 2005, the Department of Transport made a public announcement stating that “South African 
municipalities will take control of the minibus taxi ranks and their management. Taxi ranks and 
routes will no longer be controlled by associations and mother bodies.” With the initiation of the 
Taxi Recapitalization Program in 2001, the Department of Transport hoped to improve road safety 
and decrease violence. However, in light of the ongoing taxi violence, it is clear that the goal has 
not yet been achieved. In 2012, Baloyi (2012) stated that the situation was the extreme opposite of 
what had been aimed at; i.e., in terms of violence and road safety, minibus taxi accidents had been 
escalating. According to minibus taxi accident reports cited in (Baloyi, 2012:35), most accidents 
involved the new vehicles described by the National Land Transition Transport Act (Act no.22 of 
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2000) as the Toyota Quantum minibuses. By 2012, these vehicles had been involved in most fatal 
vehicle accidents and were consequently criticized by Baloyi (2012:35) for ‘exploding’ on impact.  
The table presented below illustrates the number of deaths caused by minibus taxi accidents in 
South Africa over a period of nine years 











                                                            Source: Road Traffic Report for the Calendar year 2009. 
Table 2.1 demonstrates the number of accidents that plagued South African road accident figures 
between 2001 and 2009. It clearly indicates that 2003 was a year of great tragedy on the roads. 
Perhaps because road users were conscious of the danger on the roads directly after 2003, the death 
toll decreased quite significantly in 2004. However, a sharp increase in the death toll is noticed 
again in the following year. Baloyi notes that “the Taxi Recapitalization Program was implemented 
in 2005 [and that], from 2005-2009, the death rate again increased rapidly” (Baloyi, 2013:35). 
 
2.9 Gender distribution in the minibus taxi industry 
Over the past 20 years, the lives of South African men and women in urban and rural areas have 
been differently affected by the revolutionary growth of the minibus taxi industry. According to a 
national survey that was conducted in 1993, 46% of people of African descent in urban areas of 
South Africa traveled by taxi, 20% used buses, and only 13% traveled by train” (Van der Reis, 
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1993 in Khosa, 1997:18). Data released by Statistics SA in its National Household Travel Survey 
(cited in Motoring industry news, 2014) which was conducted to investigate the travel patterns of 
people in the country revealed that taxis “were the main source of transport for most households 
at 41.6 percent as compared to private cars (13.7 percent), buses (10.2 percent), car passengers 
(13.7 percent) and trains (4.4 percent)”. According to MrPali Lehohla who is the General 
statistician “the number of people who used taxis had increased from 59 percent in 2003 to 69 
percent last year in 2015” (Monama, 2014;1). 
At the time Khosa conducted two studies on the taxi industry in the 1990s (Khosa 1990; 1994), 
this author noted that the majority of the users of public transport in South Africa were Black 
people of African descent comprising mainly women. As far back as 1994, Khosa stated that the 
literature on the history of the taxi industry in South Africa had “failed to examine gender relations 
in the taxi service”. In the South African taxi industry, the issues of gender relations and the 
unequal relation of power between women and men seem to have mitigated against women’s full 
participation in the industry. From the inception of the minibus taxi industry, African men and 
women have been involved in this enterprise at three levels: (1) as taxi owners; (2) as employed 
drivers; and (3) as commuters (Khosa 1997:19). Evidence gathered on power relations in the taxi 
industry has revealed that “the experiences of men and women differ and this is because of the 
gender roles ascribed to men and women” (Khosa, 1997:19). Many women have challenged the 
established gender roles and have done “what women are not supposed to do in society; that is, 
they became female taxi drivers not because they wanted to fight their way into a male dominated 
industry, but because it was ‘a choice of last resort’”.  
According to Chapman (1987 in Khosa, 1997), transport is an essential element in everyday life, 
particularly in women’s lives. It allows them access to a wide variety of vital resources and 
activities such as health care, child care, education and employment. However, “it is unfortunate 
that most planning and development decisions in the transport arena are made by men with little 
or no regard for women’s needs” (Turner & Fouracre, 1995 in Khosa, 1997:19).                              
Khosa (1997) further argues that “gender differences in travel patterns, behaviour and modal 
choice expose men and women to different risks through [sic] the world.” This author further 
propagates that, “apart from the problems of overloading and the attendant hazards of sexual 
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harassment or so-called ‘eve teasing’, women and the aged and the infirm suffer more seriously 
from the poor design of vehicles and [from] the way in which they are driven.” 
Turner and Fouracre (1995) reached the following conclusions based on their survey of transport 
in developing countries:  
“First, women do not have the same job opportunities in the transport sector as 
men. Second, transport tends not to be user-friendly to women and there are more 
adverse impacts on women than on men. Third, there is a low participation of 
women in the transport sector as a direct result of the nature of the transport system. 
Fourth, transport is generally unfriendly towards women and transport projects 
have not usually worked through project approval to determine how they impact 
the transport system” (Turner & Fouracre, 1995 cited in Khosa, 1997:5).  
Khosa (1997:20) states that in South Africa, African townships are located far from places of work 
and, “as a result of forced removals, some commuters have to leave their homes at dusk, only to 
return home after dawn. This pattern has exposed commuters, especially women, to crime and also 
(sexual) harassment at bus and taxi ranks and in vehicles, especially in the evening.”  
The experiences of women when travelling by minibus taxi are reportedly different from those of 
men. Women often experience harassment in one form or another by male passengers as well as 
by male taxi drivers. The forms of abuse may vary from verbal comments and unacceptable 
gestures to insults and even assault (Khosa, 1997). 
were women. Moreover, little improvement around the issue of gender relations in the taxi industry 
existed in Durban in 1994, where an estimated 7% of taxi drivers were women at the time. These 
figures indicate that women were reluctant to join this industry about 20 years ago. However, 
current statistics reveal that more women are breaking down gender barriers and entering in their 
masses an industry which was once dominated by men. In the past two decades, the number of 
women in this industry has remarkably grown and currently sits at about 15%” (Mbatha;1, 2016) 
Evidence in Gauteng province in 1990 suggested that about 10% of taxi drivers and taxi owners  
According to Khosa (1997:31), “the histories of men and women taxi drivers weave together the 
changing social, economic and political processes that govern capital accumulation in the taxi 
industry.” Therefore, even though both men and women taxi drivers are usually underpaid, wages 
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for female taxi operators are even lower [than those for men]. The reasons for entering the taxi 
industry for both men and women drivers appear to be similar - they either were retrenched, or 
could not find alternative employment (Khosa, 1997:31). 
 
2.10 The impact of political struggles on public transport 
According to Abrahams (2010), the role of apartheid that bestowed supremacy, freedom and 
opportunity on the white population for years was the spark that flared up the destructive system 
of political violence. 
KwaZulu-Natal was one province that experienced intense political violence. Moyake (2006) 
states that the political setting in South Africa forced many individuals to flee the country from as 
early as the early 1950s.  As a result of the political struggle, many business owners could not 
make reasonable profits due to the circumstances of that time. There were many reasons that forced 
people to leave the country and seek refuge in far and neighbouring countries. Some of these 
reasons gave birth to ‘unregulated industries’, with the South African taxi industry being one of 
them (Moyake, 2006).  Bonnin (2004) argues that, prior to the democratic elections in 1994, “the 
political violence that the population of KZN witnessed and participated in during the period of 
1987 to the mid 1900s was fundamentally different to anything that had gone before.” Violence 
was intense in such a way that it ‘re-territorialised’ the province. There were now areas that were 
labeled ‘no go areas’ for supporters of one or the other political group.  
One of the township that experienced the most gruesome political violence between 1978 and the 
1990s, preceding the 1994 democratic elections, was Mpumalanga township in KwaZulu-Natal. 
According to Abrahams (2010), in 1987 the situation in this township intensified which resulted 
in the formation of ‘closed’ zones which were areas that were not accessible to groups outside the 
politically supreme group in a specific area. Moreover, the violence took a shift from the 
‘specialized’ form of violent attacks on individuals to attacks on households and the pursuit of 
territory (Abrahams, 2010). For example, violent clashes occurred between the followers of the 
Inkatha Freedom Party, the United Democratic Front and the African National Congress. Bonnin 
(2004:9) describes the situation in this township as follows: 
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“The streets of Mpumalanga Township also became a dangerous and unsafe place. 
Walking along the streets meant being vulnerable to attacks. Guns were fired in 
public spaces and stray bullets claimed the lives of many. Well-known Inkatha 
warriors cruised the streets in their familiar cars, identified by nicknames. While 
their purpose might have been to kill specific ‘comrades’, they also abducted girls 
for sex. Gender and age impacted on the ways in which different groups managed 
access to the increasingly unsafe space of the streets. Groups of mostly male youth 
gathered on street corners, ready to accost and attack those suspected to be 
supporters of the other party. They claimed the right [to prevent] other taxis to 
pass, refused them access, and observed and challenged passersby (Bonnin, 
2004:12).  
 
2.11 The impact of apartheid legislation on public transportation in South Africa  
Jenkins (1996 cited in Abrahams, 2010:496) gives a description of apartheid as a method or 
arrangement that consisted of two philosophical themes of White domination that “attempted to 
guarantee racial peace and maintain a pure white race”. The first philosophical theme was 
‘segregation as a means of domination’.  Black people of African descent were marginalized, 
secluded and banned from freely participating in society. The second philosophical theme was 
‘segregation as trusteeship’, which allowed Black people of African descent to only “express 
themselves completely within their own communities”. 
Moyake (2006) states that the policy of apartheid goes back all the way to the commencement of 
White settlement in South Africa in the year 1652. Apartheid was a policy of social and political 
superiority that was written into law. It was a form of f “superiority” that applied in all regions and 
countries that were colonized across the world by European traders first, and then settlers. The 
Nationalist government that came into power in 1948 then formalized this ‘attitude of superiority’ 
into law. 
 
2.11.1 Population registration Act 23 of 1950 
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This law categorized all South Africans according to the racial group they belonged to. This 
classification would regulate where people were allowed to stay and also determined the kind of 
work they would be allowed to do. In this way, apartheid was implemented. South Africans were 
identified by three racial categories: Black (or Bantu), White, and Coloured (mixed race). Asian 
(Indian and Parkistani people) became the fourth category and was added later (Moyake, 2006). 
Abrahams (2010) informs that the word ‘white’ comprised all persons of Afrikaner or English 
origin, as well as people from other European descent, such as Germans and Portuguese. Coloureds 
were identified as people of ‘mixed race’. Indians were referred to descendants of indentured 
servants brought from the Indian subcontinent by the British to work in the sugar plantations in 
Natal. ‘Bantus’ were referred to as persons solely of African descent. The Bantus were later further 
divided into nine ethnically based ‘national units’: Tswana, North Sotho, Zulu, South Sotho, 
Swazi, Xhosa, Ndebele, Venda and Tsonga.    
 
2.11.2 Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 
This law allocated races to different residential and business sections in urban areas (Moyake, 
2006). Towns and cities were divided into areas that were each reserved for one race only. All 
people of ‘colour’ who lived in areas that had been demarcated as ‘white areas’ were removed by 
force to new areas which were reserved for the occupation of other race groups.  
 
2.11.3 The Natives Land Act no.27 of 1913 
This act was later given the name ‘Bantu Land Act of 1913’ and the ‘Black Land Act of 1913’. 
These laws in particular were part of the segregation laws that were passed in the late 1940s 
(Mlangeni, 2013). This law allocated not more than 7% of arable land to people of African descent 
whereas the the more fertile was left for the occupation of Whites (South African History, online, 
n.d.). This law restricted Blacks from purchasing or leasing land from Whites; however, White 
people were allowed to purchase land from Black people. 
According to (Mlangeni, 2013), Black people could only live in urban areas if they could prove 
that they had a form of employment.  As much as the policy implementers of apartheid excluded 
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Black people from economic enterprise, their labour was required in industries, on the mines, and 
in agriculture. In cities and large towns, this then resulted in the reservation of certain outlying 
areas as townships to demarcate locations where local and migrant workers could dwell while 
working in the towns or cities. These workers often had to walk long distances to and from work, 
which the apartheid Government considered normal for Africans. The Government-owned 
PUTCO bus services and the SAR (South African Railway Services) were inadequate in meeting 
the demand for public transport. This gave rise to the advent of the South African taxi industry, 
which is now one of the largest contributors to the country’s economy. 
 
2.12 The period from 1977-1987 in South Africa-Commissions of enquiry to solve disputes 
in the transport industry  
With the advent of the minibus taxi transport to address the transport needs of Black people in 
South Africa, a number of conflicts arose which often resulted in crime, violence and death. The 
conflicts also caused many riots and boycotts. “The Government feared that the situation would 
deteriorate and result in heightened polarization. In the 1970s various commissions of inquiry were 
established and appointed [to look] into transport deregulation” (Dugard, 2009:9 in Moyake, 2006: 
60), with the purpose of finding solutions for this problem that was escalating and thus unraveling 
the South African economic and social tapestry. The most important legal instruments in the 
transport industry and the reasons for, as well as the role played by, the commissions of inquiry 
will be discussed. The issues these commissions identified during their investigations will also be 
outlined.  
 
2.12.1 The Land Road Transport Board 
Passengers are transported daily in our country. They are transported using different modes of 
transport to cater for people’s needs. The Road Transport Act 74 of 1977 (RTA) mandated the 
issuing of permits and the licensing “of all persons, entities and vehicles that provide a road 
transportation service in South Africa” (Moyake, 2006:61). This Act provided that all operators 
who carried passengers in their vehicles for financial gain had to get authorization to do so. This 
was referred to as a ‘public carriers permit’ and it had to be acquired before one started transporting 
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passengers. This Act also required that “the vehicles are safe, secure, and reliable, of good quality 
and efficient, whether [transporting passengers] locally or over long distances” (ibid.). However, 
obtaining such permits was unwieldy due to the political state of the country at that time.  
 
2.12.2 Driver’s permit application for taxi operation  
Subsequent to the establishment and appointment of the various bodies to investigate issues around 
the taxi industry, the Road Transport Act of 1977 became effective early in the year 1978. The act 
offered aspiring taxi operators a loophole that allowed operators to shift from six-seater sedans to 
ten-seater kombis which could carry up to eighteen passengers (McClaul, 1990 cited in Jefthas, 
2003). However, this Act failed to legally define ‘taxis’ as it defined a bus as a motor vehicle 
designed for the transportation of more than nine passengers, driver included, (Fourie, 2003). This 
opened up an opportunity for Black taxi operators to operate as long as the total number of 
passengers they transported did not exceed eight (Nustad, 2000 in Jefthas, 2003). The Act paved 
the way for the formalization of the legal use of minibus taxis instead of sedan cars and 
entrepreneurs gradually began to capture an increasing share of the Black commuter market 
(McClaul, 1990:35 cited in Moyake, 2006). By 1982, “more than 90% of the so-called ‘Black 
taxis’ were minibuses” (The Natal Witness, 1989, April 22, cited in McClaul, 1990:39).  Taxis 
operating on South African roads started increasing in number at a rapid pace. “Minibuses 
registered by Blacks increased throughout the country from 12 400 in 1979 to 22 300 in 1982” 
(Rapp, 1993).  
In accordance with the Act of 1977, all operators of minibus taxis that carried passengers for 
financial gain had to obtain public carrier permits from the Land Road Transportation Boards 
(LRTB). As part of the requirements of the taxi permit application, the minibus taxi operator had 
to prove that the existing public transport facilities were not sufficient to meet the public’s needs 
in a certain area (McClaul, 1990:40 cited in Moyake, 2006:62). 
Operators were also required to obtain and produce a certificate of roadworthiness for their 
vehicles. Vehicle had to be in good enough condition to carry passengers, the taxi operator was 
required to carry a public service driver’s license in the vehicle, and there were additional 
requirements that pertained to certain areas. The need for a faster, convenient and reliable mode 
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of transport grew at a more rapid rate. The services of buses and trains were no longer in high 
demand as they were now thought to be undependable, irregular, overcrowded and a symbol of 
the oppressive apartheid regime. This demand for kombi taxis gave rise to the mushrooming of the 
Black taxi industry (Moolman & Kgosimore, 1993:33). 
The limited number of permits and the difficulties applicants faced when it came to obtaining them 
gave rise to bribery and corruption among taxi owners and law enforcement officers (Fourie, 
2003:33). Owners and operators saw an opportunity to make a lucrative profit in the industry 
without having to act within the law (Jefthas, 2003). Evans and Cooks (1985, cited in Jefthas, 
2003:11) argue that the illegal dealings gave rise to the proliferation of kombi/minibus taxis in the 
informal transport sector. They further highlight the problem of law enforcement by stating that 
there was a severe shortage of law enforcement officials assigned to the task of policing the taxi 




2.12.3 The Van Breda Commission of Inquiry 
According to Khosa, (2003:17 cited in Moyake, 2006), following the intense violent atmosphere 
that was ignited by the political uprising during 1976, the Government feared that the situation 
might intensify and disrupt the normal functioning of the transport sector. In 1977, the Government 
established and appointed commissions of inquiry. The Van Breda Commission was among those 
commissions. This body became active in 1978. Based on its investigations, it concluded that 
“South Africa had reached a stage of economic and industrial development which enables it to 
move towards a freer competition in transportation (McClaul, 1990:37 cited in Moyake, 2006:63). 
This Commission also identified that the taxi industry was not supported financially by the 
Government because of the industry’s “escalating politicization and economic inefficiency” 
(Moyake, 2006:63). However, according to Shaw (1998:8), some of the reasons why commuters 
of public transportation opted for minibus taxis instead of trains and buses were “due to the poor 
levels of service provided by the formal modes of bus and train transport”. Bus companies started 
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to become highly alarmed by the competitiveness and the success of the minibus taxi industry. 
This, in due course, led to the Welgemoed Commission of Inquiry. 
 
2.12.4 The Welgemoed Commission of Inquiry 
Subsequent to bus operators’ battle to maintain their domination in the transport industry and the 
rise in support for the deregulation of the transport industry was the establishment of this 
commission of inquiry. The Welgemoed Commission of Inquiry was established in 1980 and 
became effective in 1981. According to Jefthas (2002), it was established with the purpose of 
investigating bus passenger transport in South Africa and to make recommendations on the 
following issues: 
 bus tariffs 
 subsidies 
 future policies 
 the impact the taxi industry has on the bus industry 
 security of the bus industry in the interest of the country 
 the desirability of coordinating bodies within Metropolitan areas 
 the desirability of the establishment of a national bus corporation (Interim Report no.1 of 
the Commission of Inquiry into bus passenger transportation in the Republic of South 
Africa, 1982). 
 
Smith (1994) claims that the Welgemoed Commission did not regard the taxi industry in a positive 
light. In May 1983, the Commission published a final report following the investigation it 
conducted into the effect that the minibus taxi industry had on the bus industry. The minibus taxi 
industry flourished and, due to its success and deregulated position in the transport industry, the 
Commission recommended a ‘shutdown’ of this industry (Essig, 1985).  It recommended that 
minibus taxis be phased out over a period of four years. The Commission further stated that ‘taxis’ 
should be metered vehicles with a carrying capacity of four passengers (Voster & Britz, 1994 cited 
in Jefthas, 2002). Naturally, the request for phasing out taxis over a four year period by the 
Welgemoed Commission was not welcomed by the taxi industry and the motor oil companies 
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(Jefthas, 2002). Other voices were raised in objection against the recommendations of this report, 
such as local authorities and some influential commercial organizations, including the South 
African Chamber of Mines (Rapp, 1993). 
 According to McClaul (1990: vii cited in Jefthas, 2002), certain members of Government were 
also not in favour of the Commission’s recommendations because they were expected to support 
a “move away from regulation and protection of vested interest and to free the industry of entry 
restrictions”. For the above reasons the Government did not implement the Commission’s report 
with immediate effect but chose to wait for the report from the National Policy Study. 
 
2.12.5 The National Transport Policy Study 
This policy group was appointed and established in 1982 and its goal was to “develop an effective 
transport policy” (Van der Rais, Moss & Viuiers, 1992 cited in Jefthas, 2002). The NTPS was 
tasked with conducting an investigation that looked at an extensive array of issues and general 
trends in Government policy. In the transport industry, this investigation was going to be different 
from that of the Welgemoed Commission (McClaul, 1990: vii).  
In 1986, the NTPS released its report and its recommendations. Generally, it was felt that its 
approach was more lenient and “less harsh on the taxi industry”. It recommended, among others, 
that “restricted and phased out deregulation of the transport industry” be revised (Ferreire, 1992). 
According to Browning (n.d, cited in McClaul, 1990:54), “the taxi standards dropped drastically 
since 1987 as permits became freely available to any applicant”. This gave rise to illegal dealings 
in the taxi industry. Subsequent to the investigation by the NTPS, Government appointed the 
Competition Board to investigate ‘pirate taxis’ in the taxi industry. After drawing conclusions 
based on its inquiry, the Board found that “the existence of pirate taxis highlighted the fact that the 
permit system was not working and the entry into the market by illegal operators could not be 
controlled through regulation” (Ferreira, 1992). Identifying the unavoidability of the presence of 
pirate taxis in the industry, the Competition Board suggested complete deregulation of the 
transport industry (McClaul, 1990). 
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2.12.6 Taxi deregulation in South Africa 
According to the Competitions Board (1987), ‘deregulation’ was not intended to mean ‘no 
deregulation’. The procedure of deregulation, in essence, “involved the redesigning of the system 
with a view to simplicity where only clear justified restrictions were left in place or introduced” 
(Competitions Board cited in Jefthas, 2002). The deregulation process was therefore implemented 
to stimulate economic and development growth as an alternative to preventing it; hence, 
deregulation was to be perceived as “the mechanism to cure unemployment and stimulate 
economic development” (Tager, 1988:2).  
However, according to Dugard (2001:8), the implementation of the deregulation process in the 
South African transport industry was not only “a means of strengthening the economy by giving 
enough Blacks a stake in the system to dilute the revolutionary climate”, but it was also a method 
for the apartheid Government “to complement its political strategy of destabilization: [i.e.,] the 
economic stratification of Black society in the open market” (Dugard 2001:8). 
Dugard (2001:8) further argues that the regulation process in the transport industry was used by 
the apartheid Government to keep Black people of African descent further divided, to prevent them 
from associating with other races, and “to protect the near-monopoly held by South African 
Transport Services (SATS) which incorporated railway and, through a complex subsidy system, 
the emerging bus industry”.  
According to Dugard (2001a:8), the regulation process in the transport industry was used by the 
apartheid Government to keep Black people of African descent further divided, to prevent them 
from associating with other races and … “to protect the near-monopoly held by South African 
Transport Services (SATS) which incorporated railway and, through a complex subsidy system, 
the emerging bus industry”.  
Implementing the process of deregulation in the South African context was somewhat problematic 
due to the political climate during that time (Jefthas, 2002). Dugard (2001) asserts that the taxi 
wars were the direct result of the rapid deregulation of transport, despite the fact that the 1976 and 
1977 uprising and revolt in the South African townships had suggested both to the Government 
and the business sector “that reform was required to prevent further unrest and political instability” 
(Argue, van Waldbeeck, Geen & Prestorius, 1992 cited in Jefthas, 2002:18). Given the violent and 
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restless historical background of the country, it is important that we gain a clear conceptual 
understanding what transport regulation refers to within a South African historical perspective. 
 
2.12.7 Governmental regulation of the South African public transport system under the apartheid 
regime   
Transport regulations predominantly ‘embodied’ the Motor Carrier Transportation Act of 1930 
which was detrimental to Black people of African descent. “They had to prove that they had a 
good employment record, had lived in the magisterial district as legally registered tenants for a 
number of years, and were in possession of a Daily Labourer’s Permit in order to obtain a public 
transport permit” (Dugard, 2001:9). This author further states the following:  
“According to the Act of 1930 (Motor Carrier Transport Act), only a 
limited number of licenses were issued and each and every taxi was 
restricted to carrying four passengers. This system meant that over ninety 
per cent of taxi permit applications by Blacks was rejected, thus 
effectively barring Blacks from participating in the economy.”  
2.12.8 The influence of the deregulation process on the minibus taxi industry 
Subsequent to the White Paper of 1987 on transport deregulation, there was a drastic increase in 
the handing out of permits by the Local Roads Transport Boards (LRTBs), e.g., from 3 752 
between 1985/86 to 16 800 between 1986/ 87, and 39 604 between 1987/88 (Ferraira, 1992 cited 
in Jefthas, 2002). Permits were issued to operators regardless of ethnicity and Dugard (2001, cited 
in Steinberg, 2001) explains that “permit enforcement following the deregulation process ceased 
to be a priority. As a result, transport authorities failed to control the growth and development of 
the industry.” According to taxi owner and director of Gauteng’s urban and public transport, 
Lennox Magwaza:  
“They [apartheid Government officials] deregulated the transport industry 
without regulating it. They made it ungovernable by issuing permits left and 
right, knowing it would cause chaos” (Dugard, 2001).  
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2.13 The period from 1987-1994 in the South African taxi industry: a period towards the      
end of apartheid 
After the implementation of the deregulation process within the South African taxi industry, 
Government permitted market forces to control entry into the minibus taxi industry. This 
encouraged virtually any applicant to be issued with a permit to operate a minibus taxi. This 
resulted in the hurried growth of the industry from the year 1987 to 1994. The environment of the 
South African minibus taxi industry soon became overcrowded. “The lack of proper enforcement 
and intense competition for the limited number of lucrative routes saw conflicts between rival 
associations ending in eruptions of violence” (Jefthas, 2002:41). 
 
2.13.1 Competition between operators in the South African transport sector 
The period from 1987 to 1994 was the time when the minibus taxi industry was doing exceptionally 
well. Minibus taxis were in high demand due to their affordability and convenience. However, this 
gave rise to vicious competition between operators. According to Fourie (2003:47), “…taxis also 
started operating in high-demand corridors serviced by buses and trains [because] taxi operators 
took this step in an attempt to boost their income as the original taxi routes have [sic] become so 
contested”. 
According to Shaw (1998), the competition between operators “reduced the potential for sustained 
cost recovery by individual operators, reduced the economy of scale benefits of higher-order 
modes, and lead to the provision of poor and inconsistent service levels to users” (Shaw, 1998 
cited in Fourie, 2003:47). Baloyi (2012) adds that, from the late 1980s, “un-roadworthy vehicles 
were a feature on public roads and vehicle accidents escalated due to speeding and negligent 
driving”. 
The rail and bus industry was losing a lot of money because minibus taxis had started to dominate 
the industry. In order to recover costs, both these industries had to compete with the taxi industry 
which continued to flourish regardless of the challenges it faced. According to Fourie (2003), bus 
and rail operators “responded to the lower demand … by reducing service frequency (essentially 
to thhoe inconvenience of commuters)”. 
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The destructive competition between operators of the South African transport sector set a stage for 
the violent taxi wars that came to dominate the regulated industry (Dugard & Sekhonyane, 2003). 
 
2.13.2 Taxi wars in the South African minibus taxi industry 
Minaar and Pretorius (1995b, cited in Jefthas, 2003:48) argue that the 1994 taxi conflicts flared up 
under the guise of new taxi associations and political groupings. According to Dugard (2001), taxi-
related violence claimed an average of nineteen lives a month with a further twenty six seriously 
injured every month. Commenting on the situation, Ingle (2009) states: “Barely a day passes in 
South Africa without media reports of some or other taxi incident which frequently involves 
straightforward murder.” Jefthas (2003) states that “from 1992 to 1994, which was the year of the 
democratic elections, there was a drastic increase in the number of accidents in taxi-related 
violence with the national figure increasing from 184 deaths in 1992 to 330 deaths in 1993.” This 
increase was attributed to the intensification of the destabilization of Black communities in the 
run-up to the election (Dugard, 2001). Taxi violence continued around the country, and between 
1994 and 1995 the number of deaths related to taxi violence decreased from 330 in 1993 to 197 in 
1994, and to 195 in 1995. This decrease was considered to be taking place due to the taxi industry 
experiencing “substantial re-organizing in response to the more permissive environment of the 
‘new’ South Africa” (Dugard, 2001 in Steinberg, 2001:136). 
Subsequent to the democratic elections of 1994, political conflicts decreased. However, this was 
not the case for taxi wars which appeared to move in the opposite direction. According to Dugard 
(2001), during the period 1991 to 1999, taxi-related violence claimed an average of nineteen lives 
a month with a further twenty six people seriously injured every month. 
According to Khosa (1992:12), the root causes of the taxi violence that has claimed the lives of 
many are centered on the following:  
 rank space;                                                      
 poaching of passengers from one association by another; 
 undercutting of fare prices; and 
 the effects of rapid deregulation.  
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Moyake (2006:182) asserts that “the general perception prevailing among the parties at war and 
other stakeholder is that the battle is for taxi routes and ranks.” From 1991 to 1999, the numbers 
of casualties related to taxi violence were recorded nationally. Table 2.1 shows that this form of 
violence still remained an unresolved issue in this period, even in the ‘new’ democratic South 
Africa, and that the death toll remained high. In this context, 1993 and 1996 were years in which 
the problem was particularly pronounced. 
Table 2.1: Number of deaths and injuries related to taxi violence 1991-1999 
Year  No. of Deaths No. of Injuries  
1991 123 156 
1992 184 293 
1993 330 526 
1994 197 314 
1995 195 282 
1996 285 586 
1997 218 335 
1998 291 343 
1999 263 287 
(Statistics: South African Institute of Race Relations: SAPS1999) 
 
2.13.3 ‘Mother bodies’ 
According to Dugard (2001), there is no clear-cut definition of a ‘mother body’, nor is there a 
specific definition of the distinction between a ‘local taxi association’ and a ‘mother body’. 
However, while taxi associations provide valuable services to commuters for a reasonable fee, 
mother bodies on the other hand concentrate on taking money and starting taxi wars. According to 
Dugard (2001), “mother bodies usually make impromptu visits to the taxi ranks to make 
‘collections’ that usually consist of henchman randomly visiting taxi ranks and extracting cash as 
much as possible from all the drivers and owners present.” Dugard (2001) further argues that the 
money collected in this way “goes directly to the pockets of the executive members of the mother 
bodies since there exist [sic] no formal financial control in the minibus taxi industry.”  
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Most reported incidents of taxi violence occur as a result of mother bodies. During the late 
apartheid era, there were only two mega associations, namely the South African Black Taxi 
Association (SABTA) and South African Long Distance Taxi Association (SALDTA). However, 
after April 1994, more mother bodies were established and in 2015, there are currently thirteen 
mother bodies operating in South Africa.  
 Dugard (2001) states that mother bodies usually consist of “loose alliances of local and long-
distance taxi associations in a particular region.” Dugard (ibid.:18) further argues that “the senior 
executives of these associations decide who can use what route and what taxi rank and how much 
[this] privilege will cost them.” Barron (1998) adds that “the only justice in this law of the jungle 
is that the executives are in as much fear as their drivers and passengers.”  
An estimate by the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) revealed that mother bodies earn over 
R100 000 monthly “per local affiliated association” (Dugard, 2001 cited in Steinberg, 2001:143). 
The growth and presence of mother bodies in the South African taxi industry has vastly influenced 
taxi operations and taxi violence. Today, there is more money to be made in controlling a mother 
body than operating a route (Dugard, 2001a). 
 
2.13.4 The role of hit-men in taxi violence 
From 1994 to 1997, events of taxi wars were rife all over the country and certain patterns started 
to emerge (Jefthas, 2002). Internal tensions between members of mother bodies started to occur 
due to power struggles and violent executive takeovers (Dugard, 2001). 
According to Torres and Minnaar (1994, cited in Jefthas, 2002:43) “one of the first hit-men 
[incidents] that was used in the violence in the taxi industry was reported in 1995 in Mamelodi 
near Pretoria where five people were killed at a taxi rank”. In 1994, “Gauteng police claimed that 
hit-men were being paid R1 000 for the death of a passenger, R2 000 and R4 000 respectively for 
the death of a taxi driver and taxi owner, and up to R10 000 if the victim was a chairman of an 
rival association” (Minaar & Pretorious, 1995b; Race Relations Survey, 1996/1997 cited in Jefthas, 
2002:44). Dugard (2001) adds that the assassination of persons by mother bodies became common. 
She commented as follows: 
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“Perhaps the most notorious mother body executive, Dickson Mampane, 
[who was] the former president of the South African Local Long 
Distance Taxi Association (SALLDTA) [and who] was allegedly 
responsible for taxi-related deaths, was assassinated in May 1997. He 
was suspected of planning SALLDTA’s hit-squad activities. He was 
rumoured to have personally killed a number of his own hit-men by 
walking behind them and shooting them in the back once they had 
completed their mission” (Dugard, 2001). 
 
2.13.5 Accusations of corruption within the SAPS  
According to Dugard (2001:4), “official corruption and collusion are major factors contributing to 
the continuation of taxi violence. In particular, the ownership of taxis by police and other 
Governmental personnel directly aids criminality in the industry and exacerbates attempts to 
resolve the violence.” 
Minaar and Pretorious (1995b in Jefthas, 2002: 45) assert that allegations mounted that some SAPS 
members had incentives in the taxi industry which led them “to either favour or victimize certain 
associations”. A report in the Sowetan in September 1995 stated that police documents had 
revealed that nearly 200 members of the SAPS allegedly owned minibus taxis (Race Relations 
Survey, 1995/96).  
In 2000, an investigation was undertaken to investigate the violence in Gauteng where police 
officials were alleged of corruption involving the taxi industry. In a report released by the 
Commission, it was stated that “members of the SAPS were said to be releasing firearms, bullet 
proof vests and even police uniforms to be used by members of taxi associations in their attacks 
against rivals.” Taxi wars continued to run rampant in the South African taxi industry with law 
enforcement agencies turning a blind eye and further perpetuating the violence through acts of 
corruption. 
 
2.13.6 The Goldstone Commission of Inquiry  
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The Goldstone Commission of inquiry was appointed on the 24th of October 1991by the then State 
President in terms of Section 3 of the Prevention of Violence and Intimidation Act of 1991 (Act 
139 of 1991). This Commission of inquiry was an independent body with the chief mandate to 
direct and gather facts with regard to public violence and intimidation in the country (Goldstone 
Commission, 1992). 
In January 1992, a separate committee under the Commission was established, particularly to 
inquire into the violence related to the transport system in the country. This committee aimed to 
determine “the nature, causes and goals of the taxi wars in the industry, along with identifying the 
persons directly involved in the instigation or the perpetration of the violence” (Goldstone 
Commission, 1992).   
A report that was released by this committee stated that “the struggle for economic survival had 
come to play a key role in the instability of the minibus taxi industry” (Jefthas, 2002). Subsequent 
to this report was evidence findings obtained from many sessions at various venues around the 
country where evidence related to taxi violence was herd (Jefthas, 2002). 
The committee discovered that, even though there were factors relating to taxi violence that were 
particular to a certain area, the root causes of taxi violence in all the areas around the country 
showed distinct similarities of violence in the minibus taxi industry (Goldstone Commission, Fifth 
Interim Report, July 1993). The committee recognized six core causes of taxi wars which were 
found to be related to all the incidents of taxi wars occurring in the industry throughout South 
Africa. In order, they were as follows (Jefthas 2002): 
 
(1) The effect of apartheid laws on urbanization;  
(2) commercial factors; 
(3) the role of the Department of Transport; 
(4) lack of law enforcement; 
(5) the absence of facilities; and 
(6) intolerance and power struggles.  
 
2.14 THE PERIOD FROM 1994-1999: a period of transformation 
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The 1994 democratic elections in South Africa gave its citizens new hope. They hoped for a 
country free from poverty and oppression, but most importantly, the end of all forms of violence. 
However, subsequent to these elections, the form and nature of taxi wars changed. The 
Government is usually blamed for not doing enough to put an end to taxi wars. For this reason, the 
persistent taxi wars finally forced the Government to intervene in the industry by establishing the 
National Taxi Task Team (NTTT). This Task Team was mandated to investigate the causes of and 
possible solutions to the ongoing taxi violence. 
 
2.14.1 The National Taxi Task Team 
The post-apartheid South African Government established the National Taxi Task Team in 1995 
(Sekhonyane & Dugard, 2004). This organization was formed with the aim of rooting out the 
problems that had led to taxi violence (Dugard, 2001:13). The NTTT comprised of the Chairperson 
from the National Department of Transport, nine Government officials from provincial 
departments of transport, ten minibus taxi industry representatives, and nine special advisors. The 
task team held approximately thirty-six public hearings between August and December 1995, 
meaning that it only took five months to determine the future of the industry. In the following year 
the NTTT issued its first report that suggested the re-registration of the minibus taxi industry. 
However, this recommendation was not well received by established taxi associations such as the 
National Taxi Alliance, which was also alleged to be further perpetrating taxi violence. The 
organization’s main concern was that consultation had been minimal and that most leading taxi 
federations had not been part of the public hearings and regulation recommendations (Dugard, 
2001 cited in Baloyi, 2012:23).  
In August 1996, the NTTT presented its final recommendations to the Minister of Transport. The 
most important recommendation was that the taxi industry be regulated and formalized as a matter 
of urgency (Dugard, 2001cited in Fourie, 2003:37). According to Dugard (2001), the proposal for 
the regulation of the taxi industry involved three connected processes:  
(1) A moratorium on permit issuing; 
(2) the registration of which taxis are operating and where they are operating; and 
(3) special legislation to address illegal operators without permits.  
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2.14.2 Recommendations by the National Taxi Task Team 
In August 1996, the final recommendations of the NTTT were published. The recommendations 
dealt with three main issues, namely: (1) effective and efficient regulation and control of the 
industry; (2) training and capacity building for both taxi members and transport officials; (3) and 
ensuring future economic viability of the industry (Jefthas, 2002). As a result, these 
recommendations were grouped into the following four categories:  
(1) Formalizing the minibus taxi industry; 
(2) Regulating and controlling the industry; 
(3) Training and capacity building; and  
(4) Economic sustainability and empowerment (Jefthas, 2002). 
 
 
2.14.3 Formalization  
The NTTT saw the implementation of a standard constitution by all taxi associations as an 
important trait for the legalization and formation of the industry. Such a standard constitution 
would deal with issues such as “a code of conduct for all taxi industry members, disciplinary 
procedures, conflict resolution procedures as well as grievance procedures [and had to take into 
account the] setting up of self-disciplinary mechanisms to punish delinquents within the taxi 
industry” (SA taxi recapitalization delayed by subsidy costs, 1996, August 16). 
The NTTT recognized that the next step which was needed was for all taxi associations to be 
registered in a Provincial Register. The NTTT argued as follows:  
“In order to structure the industry democratically, openly and 
transparently, the rules by which it is governed should be accessible to 
members of the industry and the commuting public alike, just like the 




2.14.4 Regulation and control  
The final NTTT recommendations regarding the issues of regulation and control comprised of a 
complete refurbishment of the permit system to turn it into “an effective and realistic permit system 
that can be properly monitored” (NTTT Final Recommendations, 1996:70). The findings of the 
NTTT were similar to those of the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry as these two bodies had 
found that the Local Road Transport Board was responsible for the instability in the taxi industry 
(Jefthas, 2002). As a result, along with the drafting of the permit system, LRTs were to be turned 
into more representative bodies (Taxi industry gears up for a safer future, 1996, August 16). In 
addition, “effective law enforcement was seen as crucial to stem the flow of violence and conflict 
in the taxi industry.” The recommendation was that sufficient strength be placed in police sectors 
to deal with taxi-related violence and that community police forums be promoted (Jefthas, 2002). 
 
2.14.5 Training and capacity building   
The NTTT also identified the need for skills training and capacity building within the minibus taxi 
industry. Such initiatives did exist prior to the release of the NTTT’s findings; however, it was 
found that these initiatives “were characterized by a lack of co-ordination and almost complete 
absence of monitoring and evaluation” (NTTT Final Recommendations, 1996:106 cited in Jefthas, 
2002:64). According to Jefthas (2002), the recommendation for that reason was that a more all-
inclusive approach be implemented to “ensure effective capacity building and skills training so 
that substantive results could be seen”. The NTTT recommended that workshops for taxi owners 
focus on issues such as negotiating skills, the operation of co-operatives and constitutional 
changes. It was recommended that workshops for taxi operators focus on advanced skills, customer 
care, life skills, the code of conduct for the industry, vehicle maintenance and safety operations, 
traffic legislation, and communication skills. Rank officials play a paramount role in the running 
of the taxi ranks, therefore a more general training course was recommended for them that should 
cover issues such as vehicle checks, environmental care, passenger care and the protection of 
people (NTTT Final Recommendations, 1996 cited in Jefthas, 2002:64).  
 
2.14.6 Economic survival, sustainability and empowerment  
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The Ministerial Committee chaired by the Minister of Transport and attended by all nine provincial 
MECs responsible for transport (MINCOM) approved of the formation of trading co-operatives 
within the taxi industry. According to Jefthas (2002), “these trading co-operatives were thus meant 
to provide services to its members who would not only lower their input costs, but would also in 
some instances provide opportunities for an increase in income.” Co-operatives were not obliged 
to become members; however, membership was going to be the only way in which they would be 
able to gain access to Government funded benefits that are only available for the taxi industry. 
The NTTT argued that the reason for establishing trading co-operatives within the taxi industry 
was based on “the recognition of a common economic need that can be met more economically by 
a group rather than an individual” (NTTT Final Recommendations, 1996:126).  
2.14.7 The impact of formalization on the taxi industry 
In 1996, the National Department of Transport issued a White Paper on future policy objectives. 
These objectives aimed to provide leadership in “the promotion of safe, reliable, effective, 
coordinated and environmentally friendly land passenger transport systems”. The White Paper was 
designed for application in South African urban and rural areas and the Southern African region 
and would be managed in an accountable manner to ensure that people experienced improved 
levels of mobility and accessibility (Turner, 1999). 
Subsequent to the White Paper issued by the Department of Transport, the Moving South Africa 
(MSA) project was launched in June 1997 with a mandate to “develop a strategy to ensure that the 
transportation system of South Africa meets the needs of South Africans in the twenty first century, 
[and that it] therefore contributes to the country’s growth and economic development”.  
According to Jefthas (2002: 38), “the analysis of passenger transport facilities and services by the 
NDOT confirmed and quantified that there is a critical lack of affordable access to transport. 
Furthermore, this analysis proved that the public transport system is ineffective and inefficient, 
resulting in an increasing dependence on private cars,” which most people of African descent could 
not and still cannot afford.  
The above-mentioned problems were heightened by “inherited patterns of land-use, the continued 
desperation of urban development and the absence of integration between land-use and transport 
planning” (Jefthas 2002:38). The MSA identified one of the key tasks for Government which was 
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“to create an enabling framework for [the] minibus taxi [industry] to recapitalize its assets and 
deepen its ability to compete fairly for market shares (Turner, 1999). The chief aim of the 
restructuring and formalization process of the minibus taxi industry was to start a local level. At 
the completion of this phase, a provincial and national infrastructure would be implemented to 
ensure stability in the industry (Jefthas, 2002).   
According to Turner (2002), the MSA transport stipulated that services and infrastructure should: 
 Provide the lowest possible cost to the customer, to the taxpayers, to the environment, to 
safety, not only now but to long-term; 
 be as affordable as possible to the users; and 
 be able to increase in flexibility and be able to respond to changing and specific sets of 
customer-needs, particularly for priority customers. 
 
The South African minibus taxi industry is embedded within the informal 
sector. However, much of its “profitability and survival have been forged 
and entrenched by cultivating a presence within the formal economy. This 
dualism has created many internal pressures for this industry and many of 
these pressures have been associated with violence and conflict among 
stakeholders” (Moyake, 2006:76). 
 
2.14.8 SANTACO as a taxi representative organ 
The South African National Taxi Council (SANTACO) was formed in 1998 and its aim was to 
embody the aspirations of all taxi operators. According to Fourie (2003:39), SANTACO was 
formed as an industry-driven response with the aim of achieving peace and unity in the taxi 
industry and developing economic benefits and empowerment for all the operators in the industry. 
SANTACO was formally launched in September 2001. At this event: 
“Delegates of all democratically elected taxi structures, Provincial Councils 
as well as mother bodies, gathered at the Durban Exhibition center for the 
‘All National Taxi Conference’. The Conference adopted a new constitution 
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for the industry, elected a new leadership and took several resolutions on all 
parliament matters in the taxi industry” (Fourie, 2003:42). 
Chief among those resolutions were improved road safety, cooperation with law enforcement, 
endorsement of a recapitalization program, and improved service to commuters (Fourie, 2003). 
The formalization of SANTACO was very effective and changes were immediately observable in 
the country. In 1999 there was a decline in the incidence of taxi violence in the country. The taxi 
regulation process had aimed to transform the industry into a ‘crime-free and customer-friendly’ 
industry that would give relief to millions of regular commuters. However, this regulation process 
was poorly received and got caught up in the fight for dominance and control among taxi 
associations.  
Making efforts to put an end to taxi wars, SANTACO, together with the National Department of 
Transport, “agreed to halt the issuing of permits to emerging taxi entrepreneurs since most routes 
were already over-traded” (Moyake, 2006:76). These two bodies planned to introduce a colour-
coded route system, satellite surveillance and a taxi-card fare system for commuters (SA taxi 
recapitalization delayed by subsidy costs, 2003). However, SANTACO and the National 
Department of Transport had disagreements about who should produce the control and electronic 
management system to be installed in each minibus taxi. This system would allow for the tracking 
of passengers and show whether the minibus taxis were on the correct route or not (Toyota puts 
on brakes as deal with taxi organization stalls, 2002).   
By this time, the South African minibus taxi industry had grown at a phenomenal rate since the 
deregulation of transport in 1987. This rapid growth influenced “the endemic violence and crime 
that marred this remarkable informal enterprise since its inception” (Fourie, 2003). In this context 
it must be noted that current developments introduced by SANTACO and the Government’s 
restructuring process do put forward the possibility for a non-violent South African taxi industry. 
 
2.15 The period from 1999 to date: Transition of the minibus taxi industry and taxi   violence 
in a democratic South Africa   
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The nature and extent of the violent attacks that have dominated the industry have minimized the 
substantial role played by the minibus taxi industry in the transport system. The Government’s 
attempts to regulate the industry resulted in a drastic increase of taxi-related violence between 
1998 and 1999. In 1999, after noticing the failure of the de-regulation process, the Government 
changed its focus to restructuring the industry through the ‘recapitalization process’ (Dugard & 
Sekhonyane, 2004). This ambitious recapitalization program “visualized the formation of a new 
taxi industry by doing away with the 16-seater minibus taxis in favour of new 18-and 35-seater 
diesel powered vehicles (Dugard & Sekhonyane 2004). 
 
2.15.1 The Taxi Recapitalization Program  
According to Mashishi (2007), the Taxi Recapitalization Program (TRP) that was first announced 
by the Government in 1999 had its roots in the final recommendations of the NTTT. This program 
was identified as a strategy to transform and regulate the South African taxi industry into a ‘new’ 
industry. The chief aim of the TRP was to “improve the quality of kombi taxi transport in South 
Africa by taking a number of steps, including institutionalizing the industry, changing the licensing 
system, regulating the industry, and replacing old vehicles with new ones” (Mashishi, 2007:2). 
The permit conversion process to operating licenses intended to force minibus taxi operators to 
confine their operations to specific routes and to stop invading routes used by rival associations 
(Fourie & Pretorius, cited in Baloyi, 2012:2). Baloyi argues that such permits “cannot be regarded 
as rights, but privileges, therefore no single association in the country can claim absolute route 
ownership”. 
The TRP was established and implemented in 2005 as Government’s response to improve the 
effectiveness of the taxi industry following the failure of the de-regulation process. The purpose 
of the TRP was to “bring about safe, effective, reliable, affordable and accessible taxi operations 
by introducing new taxi vehicles (NTVs) designed to undertake public transport functions in the 
taxi industry (Cokayne, cited in Baloyi, 2012:2). With the taxi recapitalization project, 
Government sought to challenge the problem of an ageing fleet within the public transport system. 
This project intended to introduce a comprehensive revision of the taxi industry where a scrapping 
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allowance would be allocated to operators as an incentive to voluntarily hand in their old vehicles 
for decommissioning (Baloyi, 2012).  
The aims of the TRP were to have a “taxi industry with a strong economy that would put 
commuters first, and that would meet the country’s socio-economic objectives. In 1997, the 
National Council of Provinces held a debate where Mac Maharaj, who was then Minister of 
Transport, specified that the restructuring of the taxi industry “should be viewed in the context of 
the democratic Government engaging in a review of the land transport policy”. This transport 
policy was aimed at primarily restructuring the way in which the function of land transport was 
managed in our country. The new policy had three pillars which were planning, regulating, and 
law enforcement (Jefthas, 2002). It was further argued that the Recapitalization Program should 
be seen “as part of a broader economic empowerment program which would give millions of Black 
people of African descent a stake in the economy in the country”. Four Government Departments 
played a major role in the drafting of the recapitalization strategy, namely: the Department of Trade 
and Industry, the Department of Minerals and Energy, the Department of Finance, as well as the 
Department of Transport. 
The Local Government Review (2008:28) indicated that the pressing challenge in the minibus taxi 
industry was that a large number of taxis were old, not roadworthy, in a really bad condition, and 
often became the cause of frequent accidents. Therefore, the TRP aimed at addressing a set of 
problems that the South African taxi industry faced at the time (Ministry of Transport, 2005). 
Moreover, taxi wars, reckless driving habits, and unsafe vehicles combined to make the taxi 
industry unpopular and to minimize its usage by commuters. It was argued that the changes 
promoted by the TRP would doubtlessly aid towards “creating safer and [a] less dangerous 
environment for the people in the industry, as well as for passengers and other drivers” (ibid.).    
The TRP intended to move the control of the taxi ranks from taxi associations to municipal 
authorities. With the moving away of the control of ranks, the South African Government 
anticipated minimizing the tension that erupted when “one association attempted to monopolize a 
rank and keep away competitors” (Baloyi, 2012:43). The TRP had good intentions for the citizens 
of South Africa; however, a drawback was the response from taxi operators, hundreds of whom 
worked directly and indirectly in the industry (Baloyi, 2012:43). 
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According to the Government, the TRP was an innovative socio-economic policy that “aimed to 
regulate, empower and develop the minibus taxi industry while integrating it with the fifty six 
broader national revenue systems such as taxation (Dugard & Sekhonyane, cited in Baloyi, 
2012:44).  
 
2.15.2 Hostility towards the Recapitalization Program 
Soon after the inception of the Recapitalization Program, it was met with negative responses. 
These negative and conflicting responses were demonstrated in the form of blockades, marches, 
intimidation, and violence by members in opposition to the program. The South African 
democratic Government had previously made the decision not to take the recommendations of the 
Goldstone Commission of Inquiry into account, which suggested that “no one association be 
identified as a representative of the entire taxi industry”. The Government thus held consultations 
with SANTACO without the presence of other stakeholders. This was because SANTACO was 
regarded as representative of the entire minibus taxi industry at the time. 
In 1999, SANTACO received official recognition from the Government as a representative organ 
of the taxi industry. However, a month after receiving this recognition, a splinter group of 
dissatisfied taxi associations came together and established an association known as the National 
Taxi Alliance (NTA) (Dugard, cited in Steinberg, 2001). In August of that year, the NTA released 
a report stating that proper consultations with all stakeholders had not occurred and called on the 
Minister of Transport to stop the Recapitalization Program. The NTA further argued that 
SANTACO had not been consulted by any taxi association or individual operator about its 
initiative and contended that “the taxi industry had been hijacked by individuals who purported to 
be speaking on behalf of the industry for their own enrichment” (Taxi alliance urges Government 
to halt recapitalization, 1999, Business Day August 16).  
 
2.15.3 The impact of the Recapitalization Program on the taxi industry in South Africa 
According to Baloyi (2012), the TRP exacerbated operational conditions in the taxi industry and 
was unable to negotiate lasting peace. The continuing conflict and violence thus often placed the 
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safety of commuters in a compromising position. Gingle (1980:37) asserts that a distinction should 
be made between “a program that provides collective benefits and one that encourages categorical 
demand during the implementation stage”. The kind of benefits a program or policy aims at should 
be consistent. Baloyi (2012) further explains that a policy should not overlook aspects related to 
how the initial objectives or benefits should be reached or distributed.  
An example of this would be the Taxi Recapitalization Program which was established to put an 
end to accidents that involved minibus taxis and also to end conflict among various rival groups. 
However, the negative impact of the TRP included loss of employment and business, safety 
problems, rising fare costs, and road accidents, many of which were fatal. 
 
2.15.4 Loss of employment and business in the industry 
South Africa is one of the countries with a high unemployment rate. In the first quarter of 2011, 
the unemployment rate was reported at 25% (Department of Labour, 2011). The Government’s 
implementation of the TRP put some taxi owners out of business and some taxi operators out of 
work, thus increasing the unemployment rate. Boudreax (2006:4) claims that the TRP was of 
benefit to some operators and a strain to others. For example, well established owners and 
operators were in a better position to afford the costs of replacing their minibus taxis than smaller 
operators (Baloyi, 2012). 
Baloyi (2012) further argued that the TRP caused harm to small-scale entrepreneurs. The 
requirement that owners should turn in old vehicles and replace them with big, new minibuses was 
simply too onerous for many operators. Some illegitimate taxi operators would also go out of 
business and this would have an impact on people such as drivers who would lose their jobs. 
Moreover, vendors whose livelihoods are tied to the minibus taxi industry would also be affected 
(Baloyi, 2012:59).  
 
2.15.5 Commuters’ safety and the cost of fares  
It was argued that, due to the unavailability of a Government subsidy for taxi fares, the TRP would 
lead to increased fare prices for passengers. Arguably, the new vehicles would cost more than R50 
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000 and this meant that operating expenses for all taxi owners would increase. A large number of 
taxi commuters would be forced to look for alternative transportation as taxi fares would be 
unaffordable. Baloyi stated that inconvenient bus and train services and walking on foot were the 
only possible alternative transportation modes (Baloyi, 2012). However, walking would expose 
commuters to dangerous situations such as becoming vulnerable targets to criminals and, because 
trains and buses run on scheduled times that can be inconvenient, people would be inconvenienced 
by “waiting costs” (Baloyi, 2012:47).  According to Cokayne (2006:9), in 2003 about 40% of the 
road death toll statistics on South African roads comprised pedestrians. Moreover, Cokayne 
(2006:9) argued that if a rise in taxi fares forced more people to walk, there was a real likelihood 
that the number of pedestrian deaths would increase. 
 
2.15.6 Road accidents 
At the time, minibus taxis were the most affordable mode of transport and also the most available. 
Among the chief aims of the TRP was the initiative to address safety issues in the taxi industry. In 
2007, the Ministry of Transport (2007) expressed its confidence in the TRP in the following 
statement: “Considering that there might be other possible causes of accidents, especially those 
involving minibus taxis, the Government has confidence in the TRP’s commitment to accident 
reduction.” The TRP promoted vehicle safety through law enforcement whereby traffic officers 
randomly inspected minibus taxis (Baloyi, 2012). The new fleet’s design did not allow for 
overloading, which is a practice that also causes accidents. However, 48% percent of taxi operators 
was unconvinced of the effectiveness of the TRP in achieving its aims “because the traffic officers 
who would be doing the random inspections would be the same officers who were taking bribes 
from the drivers” (Fourie 2003).          
In light of the above, Mckay and Callie (2010:32) argue that, given all these factors, it seemed that 
there was no “substantial attempt by the Government through the Recapitalization Program to 
minimize taxi violence and the amount of road accidents to increase revenue in the industry”. 
 
2.15.7 The transition of taxi violence in a democratic South Africa 
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In South Arica, violence and injuries are “the second leading causes of death and the loss of 
disability-adjusted life years” (Seedat, Van Niekerk, Jewkes, Suffia & Ratele, 2009). These 
scholars further claim that violence in this country is intensely gendered, “with young men (aged 
15-29 years) excessively engaged in violence both as victims and perpetrators”. Social problems 
exacerbating this problem have been identified to include poverty, unemployment, exposure to 
violence, widespread access to firearms, and failure to uphold safety and basic rights (Seedat et. 
al, 2009). 
During the apartheid era, the incidents of taxi violence were very few in number and less criminal 
in nature. They were often linked to the political violence that troubled the country at that time. 
The current state and incidents of taxi violence in the post-apartheid era are said to be “more 
prevalent, more regionalized and more criminal in nature”; i.e., taxi violence is now far more 
complex and creative (Dugard, 2001). It is characterized by threats, corruption, brutal attacks, 
illegal dealings, assaults, and assassinations.  
Conversely, Steve Hunt of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) contends that 
the root causes of violence in South Africa have not changed much since the apartheid era. 
According to the Johannesburg based Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR, 
n.d), South Africa’s current high rate of violent crime “is not just related to economic and social 
marginalization as it was during the 1980s”.  In this context, Ingle (2009) asserts that the violence 
is not only confined to the taxi sector, but that it is sometimes directed at other transport sectors as 
well, most especially bus operators and even Metrorail, as was the case in the apartheid era. 
Croucamp (2003) asserts that foreign nationals are usually hired to act as ‘hit-men’ to eliminate 
rival ‘strongmen’ that cause “a mafia-style nature of violence in the taxi industry”. He further 
corroborates the widely held notion that some members of the South African Police Service are 
often complicit in this form of violent crime. 
In March 2000, the KwaZulu-Natal Taxi Commission of Inquiry into Violence held a meeting in 
Durban. After this meeting, a report was released entitled Perspectives on KwaZulu-Natal. The 
Taxi Commission of Inquiry: Cleaning up the taxi industry in KwaZulu-Natal. This report was 
submitted to the Premier and recorded the various incidents of taxi violence which had engulfed 
the province of KwaZulu-Natal in the period prior to its release. At this meeting, the Commission 
heard accounts of “events of cold-blood murder executed only for personal gain, saw accusatory 
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fingers pointed at every direction, and heard stories of fear and mistrust” (ibid.). This report also 
revealed that the minibus taxi industry in KwaZulu-Natal was a massive industry; however, there 
were no exact figures because of the lack of regulatory measures. It could only be estimated that 
the actual figure of registered taxis was as high as 13 000, with thousands more operating illegally. 
The leadership positions and the most lucrative routes -particularly long distance trips such as from 
Durban to Johannesburg and to Swaziland and Nongoma - were reported as well worth fighting 
for. When taxi bosses felt that competitors were encroaching on their turf, it was time to ‘clean up’ 
the route; in other words, this was done by killing.  
Bronwyn Harris of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (SCVR) stated that 
“the more things change, the more they stay the same” (Harris, 2003:1), because twenty two years 
after the democratic elections, conflicts still arise as a result of taxi violence. Harris (2003) claimed 
that high levels of violence continue to plague our society and that mistrust; suspicion and fear are 
primary components of many inter-personal relationships. He further argued that, “contrary to the 
popular representation of South Africa as a ‘miracle’ nation, high levels of violence testify that a 
post-apartheid South Arica is not conflict free” (Harris, 2003: 1) 
Government’s attempts to restructure the taxi industry have been very slow and this has resulted 
in widespread lawlessness and authorities’ inability to manage and curb taxi violence. The 
deregulation process in particular has been identified as a major contributing factor to the ongoing 
incidents of taxi violence. For this reason, part of the process of re-regulating the taxi industry 
included a four-year recapitalization plan, which, unfortunately, has been delayed. These delays 
have occurred due to opposition and disagreements among owners of taxis. However, in some 
parts of the country (i.e. Cape Town), taxis seem to be in a far better shape in 2016 than they were 
in 2006. One can argue that recapitalization brought about significant changes in the build up to 
the 2010 FIFA World Cup ( State of the cities report, 2011: 76). 
Taxi violence is not a new phenomenon in South Africa. However, the irony is that the problem 
seems even more insurmountable than ever before. According to Harris (2003:1), “the persistence 
of old patterns of violence threaten South Africa’s fragile democracy. They challenge the notion 
that legislated change and human rights frameworks will automatically bring an end to violence 
within an already violent, militarized society.” The persistence of violence within South Africa 
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also highlights what has been termed a ‘culture of violence’ within the country (Simpson, 
Mokwena & Segal, 1992; Hamber, 1998 cited in Harris, 2003) 
 
2.16 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the emergence of the South African Black taxi industry since the late 
1970s. The minibus taxi industry has created and sustained over 200 000 jobs for South Africans 
over the past forty years. It has been argued that this industry has engendered a unique culture and 
has created a passenger control system that moves hundreds and thousands of passengers daily to 
school, to work and to other places of social and recreational interest. However, this industry is 
associated with many incidents of conflict and violence that have accompanied its growth from its 
earliest origins. Violence and corruption have thus concealed the positive growth and the many 
success stories within the industry.  


























This chapter presents a discussion of the two theoretical frameworks that underpinned the study, 
namely: the conflict theory and the labeling theory. The theoretical framework of the study was an 
important aspect because it provided a grounding base, or an anchor, for the literature review and, 
most importantly, for the methodological and analysis processes, as proposed by Grant and 
Osanloo (2014:12). In research, theories are selected to address the questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
a phenomenon occurs, to make generalizations of the phenomenon, and to identify the limits to 
those generalizations. 
 
3.2 Conflict theory 
The conflict theory is rooted in the work of Karl Marx (1818-1883) and other social critics of the 
nineteenth century such as Max Weber (1864-1920) and George Simmel (1858-1918). 
Karl Marx (1818-1883) came to live in England after he had been exiled form Germany, his 
country of origin after he had proposed revolutionary ideas. He strongly believed that people 
should try to change the society they live in and also believed that “the engine of human history is 
class conflict” (Henslin, 2013). In this context, Marx stated the following: 
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“The bourgeoisie are locked in conflict with the proletariat. The biggest struggle 
can end only when members of the working class unite in revolution and throw 
off their chains in bondage. The result will be a classless society, one free of 
exploitation, in which people will work according to their abilities and receive 
according to their needs (Marx & Engels, 1848-1967).   
Like Marx, Max Weber (1864-1920) was the most influential of all sociologists of his time. Weber 
agreed with Marx’s claim that economics play a fundamental role in power differences in society. 
The conflict theory proposes that “all societies are in a process of constant change and that this 
dynamic process inevitably creates conflicts among various groups” (Chambliss & Seldman, 
1971).  
According to Tischler (1983), social change that is generated by social conflict is a normal state 
of affairs. In addition, Tibbetts (2012:178) states that most societal conflicts occur as a result of 
competition in which each group endeavours to have its interests promoted, protected, and often 
put into law. He further argues that “if all groups were equally powerful and had the same amount 
of resources, such battles would involve much negotiation and compromise.”  
Conflict theorists believe that social order results from dominant groups making sure that 
subordinate groups are loyal to the institutions that are the dominant groups’ source of wealth, 
power and prestige (Tischler, 1983). He further explains that “the superior groups will use 
coercion, constraint, and even force to help control those people who are voluntarily loyal to the 
laws and rules they have made.”  Tibbetts (2012) supports this statement and adds that laws are 
thus created and enforced in a way that superior groups can suppress subordinate groups. 
According to Tischler (1983), when social order cannot be maintained through rules and laws, the 
minority groups rebel and this often results in change. In addition, he further asserts that conflict 
theorists are concerned about the issue of who benefits from particular social arrangements and 
how those in power maintain their position and continue to reap benefits from them. Tischler 
(1983) further argues that the ruling class is seen as a group that spreads certain values, beliefs, 
and social arrangements in order to enhance its power and wealth. The social order then reflects 
the outcome of a struggle among those with unequal power and resources. Tibbetts (2012) asserts 
that the state of inequality resulting in repression creates a sense of injustice and unfairness among 
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members of the less powerful groups, and such feelings are a primary cause of crime. Furthermore, 
Turk (1969) ascertains this statement by stating that the competition for power among various 
groups in society is the major cause of crime, violence and conflict. 
This theory is applicable to this study as it gives comprehensive information as to what causes 
crime, conflict and violence. Conflict in the South African minibus taxi industry occurs as a result 
of violent battles among associations of owners for wealth, power and dominance. This industry 
is driven by greed as each owner, whether he/she has ten taxis or two, wishes to bring as large an 
area as possible under his/her influence and into his/her sphere of operations. This causes conflict 
as certain drivers who hold greater power keep accumulating wealth while the rest only dream of 
achieving that goal. The taxi industry is constantly changing; new policies such as the deregulation 
policy and the Recapitalization Programme are introduced and the preferential use of new diesel-
powered vehicles are enforced by regulations in the hope of eradicating the violent situation in the 
South African minibus taxi industry. However, the introduction and implementation of such 
policies have resulted in ongoing conflicts that have caused much bloodshed in many communities. 
The conflict theory is relevant to the current situation in the South African minibus taxi industry 
in that this theory postulates that all societies are in a mode of constant change and this dynamic 
process creates conflict within and among various groups. To date, many of the violent conflicts 
in the minibus taxi industry have occurred as a result of inequalities, lack of communication, 
intolerance, poor negotiating skills, as well as greed. 
Framing this study within the conflict theory was therefore appropriate as it indicates that 
oppression and inequality create change and a sense of injustice among minority groups, and that 
such feelings often lead to violence. 
 
3.3 Labeling theory 
Another theory that was of great significance to this particular study was the labeling theory. The 
theoretical labeling approach first appeared at the beginning of the 1960s. Frank Tinnenbaum and 
George Hebert Herbert Mead are usually declared to be the forerunners of this approach. 
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Frank Tinnenbaum is best known for his ‘dramatization of evil’ concept (Knutsson, 1978:18). This 
concept covers a process of “tagging, defining, identifying, segregating, describing, emphasizing, 
making conclusions and [being] self-conscious….”  (Tinnenbaum, 1938 cited in Knutsson, 
1978:18).   
The labeling theory is a theory that is based on how the self-identity and the behaviour of certain 
individuals can be decided or affected by the expressions used by others to define or categorize 
them. It is closely linked with two ideas, namely the ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ and ‘stereotyping’. 
The labeling theory argues that deviance does not exist as a natural or an essential part of an action. 
As replacement for that, this theory places emphasis on the inclination of ‘majorities to negatively 
label minorities or ‘to label’ those perceived as being different from ‘standard cultural norms’.  
This theory proposes that individuals convert to criminality as a result of labels that are attached 
to them by society and that, when they begin to conform to such labels, they reflect their personal 
identity. There are two most significant terms in the labeling theory which Edwin Lemert (1951) 
distinguishes as ‘primary deviance’ and ‘secondary deviance’. 
‘Primary deviance’ pertains to the events of deviant behaviours that several people engage in. 
‘Secondary deviance’ on the other hand, is when a person creates something out of that deviant 
behaviour, thus creating a negative social label that alters that person’s self-concept and social 
identity.  The negative label is referred to as a stigma. 
This theory is largely geared in the direction of individuals’ identities within society, with the focus 
mainly on the labels attached to those individuals - mostly because they do not ‘fit into’ the typical 
norm. According to Plummer (1979), the labeling theory highlights social responses to crime and 
deviance. In its narrowest version, it asks what happens to individuals as they have been labeled 
and suggests that crime may be heightened by criminal sanctions. In his classic study, Crime and 
the Community, Frank Tinnenbaum (1983:19-20) argues as follows:   
“The process of making the criminal therefore is a process of tagging, defining, 
identifying, segregating, describing, emphasizing, [and] evoking the very traits 
that are complained of… the person becomes the thing he is described as being… 
the way out is a refusal to dramatize the evil.” 
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Tibbetts (2012) asserts that “an offender becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy…and [this] results in 
individuals confirming their status as criminals or delinquents by increasing the frequency or 
seriousness of their illegal activity.” In this context, Hebert Herbert Mead, a member of the 
Chicago School, states that a person’s sense of self “is constantly constructed and reconstructed 
through the various social interactions a person has on a daily basis” (Mead, 1934:172). 
Each and every individual is continually aware of how he or she is being judged by other 
individuals through various social connections. Tibbetts (2012) gives us a practical example of 
how labels are attached to individuals. He writes:  
“When growing up, you probably heard your parents or guardians warn that you 
should not hang out with Johnny or Sally because they were ‘bad’ kids. Or perhaps 
you were a Johnny or a Sally at some point” (Tibbets, 2012: 179). 
He draws our attention to the fact that specific individuals can be labeled by society or authorities, 
and these persons are then disliked by majority groups. In addition, Lemert (1972 cited in Tibbetts 
2012) makes a highly noteworthy comment on how labeling affects criminality among those who 
are labeled. He argues that individuals commit primary deviance, which is less serious, nonviolent 
and not frequent, but if they happen to get caught by the authority (i.e., the police), they are then 
later labeled. The dishonour of being labeled makes them perceive themselves as offenders and 
this forces them to associate with other offenders. This results in what Lemert refers to as 
secondary deviance, in which offending becomes more serious, is often violent, and far more 
frequent (Tibbetts, 2012:178).  
This theory is applicable to the crime phenomenon under study. Operators of minibus taxis are 
often labeled as deviant, hooligans, ill-mannered and law-breaking individuals. They are labeled 
as having no respect and no regard for passengers, and that they often use foul language when 
communicating with one another at taxi ranks and also when addressing passengers. With such 
labels these drivers have no choice but to conform and ‘become’ what they have been labeled. 
Their behaviour, which is not condoned by the communities they work with, can therefore be 
identified as primary deviance, whereas secondary deviance is the escalation and deterioration of 
the behaviour, which more often than not deteriorates into violence.  Evidence supporting the 
above statement will emerge in the discussion of findings.  
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I also drew from the work of Gloria Sauti, entitled Minibus taxi drivers: are they all children born 
from the same mother? to further argue the significance and applicability of this theory to my 
research. 
Sauti (2006) conducted a study to determine if complaints from commuters and society on the 
driving habits, behaviour and attitudes of minibus taxi drivers were lawful and whether or not they 
[taxi drivers] could all be labeled ‘children born of the same mother’. According to Sauti (2006), 
“children [actually] born from the same mother are in most instances brought up in the same home. 
They have similar beliefs in most instances, especially in terms of acceptable practices or behavior 
at home or within their society.” She adds that some of the main labels and complaints about 
minibus taxi drivers from the public are that they: 
 drive badly and have no regard for the safety of commuters; 
 drive taxis which are supposed to be scrapped because they are not regularly serviced and 
prone to accidents; 
 have no regard for the rules of the road; 
 would stop at any point along operational routes without warning, picking up or dropping 
off passengers; 
 ask for small change from fellow drivers in the middle of the road, endangering the lives 
of passengers and other road users; 
 are arrogant, problematic, and have an ‘attitude’; 
 often team up [against] and attack those who disagree with them at the ranks or along the 
routes; 
 are only interested in making a profit rather than care about commuters; 
 behave as if they are doing passengers a favour rather than taking into consideration that 
they pay for the journeys;   
 all behave in similar ways (Sauti, 2006:7). 
Her observations revealed that there were indeed similarities in their driving and the manner in 










This chapter will provide an overview of the methodology used in this study. The discussion in 
this chapter is centered on the research design, population sampling, and the data collection and 
data analysis processes. Data were collected by interviewing drivers of minibus taxis in the 
Mpumalanga township. The ethical considerations and the procedures to ensure the reliability of 
the study are also discussed. 
 
4.2 Nature of the study 
The study used a qualitative method and an interpretive approach by probing the verbal responses 
from taxi drivers using semi-structured interviews in an attempt to understand their beliefs, 
behaviours and attitudes towards the ongoing issue of taxi violence in their area of operation. 
This study drew upon the qualitative method of obtaining and analyzing information. Qualitative 
research is a useful tool when defining the process of making meaning and in describing how 
people interpret what they experience (Cohen, Manton & Morrison, 2012 cited in Mthembu, 2012: 
16). The qualitative approach is “concerned with people’s perspective of their world and their 
experiences and therefore generates insights rather than statistical analysis” (Maree, 2007 cited in 
Mthembu, 2012:16). As a result, qualitative techniques allow the researcher “to share in the 
understandings and perceptions of others to explore how people structure and give meaning to 
their daily lives” (Berg, 2007). 
In order to fully understand the issues around taxi violence, the researcher drew upon the conflict 
theory as well as the labeling theory. This research study was empirical in nature and both primary 
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and secondary data sources were employed. The primary data were collected from books, journals 
and online sources. Individual in-depth interviews were employed as a means of collecting primary 
data. 
 4.3 Profile of Mpumalanga township 
This study was conducted in Mpumalanga township, which is a township on the outskirts of 
Durban, KwaZulu-Natal. The township lies within the outer west operational entity of the 
eThekwini Municipality, some 50 km from the Durban Central Business District. This residential 
area has a population of about 130 000 people. The University of KwaZulu-Natal Center for 
Criminal Justice (CCJ) states that Mpumalanga is “a peri-urban township surrounded by 
communities under the traditional leadership of ‘Amakhosi’ and ‘Izinduna’. According to the 
South African Cities Network Training for Township Renewal Initiative (TTRI, 2011:7) “the 
population is growing at a rate of five percent per year, mostly due to natural growth and the in-
migration of people from deep rural areas.” According to the eThekwini Municipality’s Integrated 
Development Plan (IDP) and the Spatial Development Framework (SDF), the area “has been 
identified as a mixed investment mode; however, economically it remains an underperforming 
area with high levels of unemployment and poverty”. Due to the effects of the pre-1994 political 
violence and neglect, some areas of this township are decaying. The nearest hospitals are in 
Durban, Pinetown and Pietermaritzburg. However, three local clinics are available but they lack 
adequate supplies and are under staffed (CCJ, 2004). 
Mpumalanga was established by the eThekwini Municipality in the late 1960s as a typical ‘labour 
reserve’. The township was established “according to regulations laid down by the department of 
Bantu Administration, to regulate the large squatter population renting on African-owned freehold 
land and to facilitate easy access for transport, surveillance and monitoring” (Mosoetsa, 2004:2). 
This area is largely dominated by Zulu-speaking individuals. Most residents of this township are 
subsistence farmers who rely on land which they own for growing crops as a means of earning an 
income. However, as a result of forced removals and spatial segregation, much of the land is owned 
by the local municipality and the people do not have enough arable land. Unemployment and the 
crime rate are high in this area. About 48 000 people are estimated to be living in poverty (i.e., 
they earn less than about R15 a day) (TTRI, 2011:7).  
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Three newer informal settlements as well as two other low-cost housing areas have become part 
of Mpumalanga township. Furthermore, “this area lacks public transport [and] commercial and 
social facilities” (TTRI, 2011:7). The inadequacy of public transport, high fare costs and 
unresolved issues around taxi violence were key reasons that influenced the researcher’s choice of 
this township as the study site. Taxi violence is a major issue in South Africa, especially in South 
African townships. The choice to sample this particular township was based on the researcher’s 
personal observations. Growing up in this area, the researcher had seen and heard of a number of 
attacks taking place at the Mpumalanga taxi rank. 
 
4.4 Sampling 
Sampling is defined as “the process of selecting a few cases from a bigger group, which is the 
entire population, to become the basis for estimating or predicting the prevalence of an unknown 
piece of information, situation or outcome regarding the bigger group” (Kumar, 2011:177). 
The process of selecting the sample from the entire population is advantageous to the researcher 
as it saves time as well as financial and human resources. A large population makes it difficult to 
analyze the data, hence using a sample helps the researcher utilize the resources at his/her exposure 
better (Venter & Strydom, 2012). The sample size for this study included 15 respondents and the 
data were collected using a non-probability sampling technique. The taxi drivers selected were 
from different age groups and were purposively selected by the researcher. Judgmental or 
purposive sampling is very useful when a researcher wants to “construct historical reality, describe 
a phenomenon or develop something about which only a little is known” (Kumar, 2011:189). The 
primary consideration in purposive sampling is to select respondents who can provide the best 
information to achieve the objectives of the study (Kumar, 2011). These participants were 
considered important in this study as some of them are old in the industry and have been driving 
since the 90’s. Some participants had recently joined the taxi industry and the researcher felt they 
could give rich data concerning the current state of the taxi industry.   
 
4.5 Research instruments 
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Conducting in-depth individual interviews was the data collection method that was employed in 
this study. The interviews were semi-structured as a means of opening up dialogue with the 
individual drivers and to allow descriptions of the people’s perceptions of what was occurring in 
their world, as stories “give theory flesh and breath” (Pratt, 1995:22). The researcher also used 
open-ended questions to allow for a free flowing dialogue and free-form answers. 
 
4.5.1 Administration of interviews 
“An interview is a conversation, whose sole purpose is to gather descriptions of the life world of 
the interviewee” (Kvale, 1996:174). Schostak (2006:54) adds that “an interview is an extendable 
conversation between partners that aims at having [eliciting] in-depth information about a certain 
topic or subject, and through which a phenomenon could be interpreted in terms of the meanings 
interviewees bring to it.” 
Interviews were conducted during the month of August, 2016 with 14 male and one female 
participant. The lady was the only female taxi driver operating from the Mpumalanga taxi rank at 
that time the data was collected. Semi-structured interviews were used to obtain information on 
the transition of taxi violence in Mpumalanga township. The researcher used semi-structured 
interviews because these questions allowed the interviewer to probe for more in-depth answers 
which thus “expand[ed] the interviewees’ responses” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005:88). 
The major intended outcome of these interviews was to gain an understanding of how taxi drivers 
interpreted their experiences and observations of taxi violence in the Mpumalanga taxi rank with 
regards to the meanings they ascribed to the terms and concepts associated with exposure to taxi 
violence. The interview schedule was written in English; however, due to language barriers, it was 
translated by the researcher into isiZulu during the interview process. Translation during these 
interviews was beneficial as it encouraged the respondents to give more information and it also 
created a free and comfortable environment for the respondents because they were able to express 
themselves better in their own language. The interviews were conducted in a local community hall 
which was convenient for both the taxi drivers and the researcher. These interviews took place 
during off-peak hours when the drivers were not busy. The respondents were selected purposively 




4.6 Data collection 
According to Kumar (2011: 220), “data collection is the most important phase in research and the 
quality of the evaluation of the findings is entirely dependent upon the data collected.” 
Furthermore, (Neuman, 2006) adds that the “gathering and recording of the data will encompass 
what the researcher has experienced and remembers. He/she will have to listen carefully to what 
his participants are saying.” An audio (tape) recorder was therefore used in this research study to 
assist the researcher in the data collection process. The permission of each participant was obtained 
for the use of the tape recorder. The instrument was checked by the researcher to establish if it was 
working properly and it was switched on and positioned in view of the participant before the 
interview commenced.  
 
4.6.1 Data analysis 
“Thematic analysis is a process of analyzing data using themes from data” (King, 2003 cited in 
Mkhize, 2010:71). It is a qualitative analytical method for identifying, analyzing and reporting 
data. The thematic approach does not only describe or organize data, but it also facilitates the 
interpretation “of a range of aspects of the research topic” (Braun & Clark, 2006:79). Themes that 
emerged from the qualitative data collected were transcribed and analyzed by the researcher. 
During the recording of the interviews between the respondents and the interviewer, similar 
patterns emerging from the participants’ experiences were listed. This allowed the researcher to 
identify all the data that related to previously categorized patterns. The responses from the 
participants that fitted under a specific pattern were then grouped together. In this manner, 
corresponding patterns were revealed. Subsequent to this step, related patterns were gathered and 
listed under sub-themes. All the themes that emerged from the study participants’ responses were 
then put together to form an inclusive depiction of the taxi drivers’ shared experiences. As a final 
process, similar or opposing themes from the literature were linked with the findings; this meant I 
had to keep going back and forth to produce quality work.    
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4.7 Ethical considerations 
When dealing with human participants, researchers are required to strictly follow ethical 
considerations. This study rigorously abided by these ethical considerations which are discussed 
in the next paragraphs. 
 
4.7.1 What do ‘ethical considerations’ entail? 
According to (Kumar 2011:17), “all professions are guided by a code of ethics that has evolved 
over the years to accommodate a changing ethos, values, needs and expectations.” The Collins 
Dictionary (1979:502 cited in Kumar, 2011) defines ‘ethics’ or ‘ethical behaviour’ as an “in 
accordance with principles of conduct that are considered correct, especially those of a given 
profession or group.” In addition, (Cohen et al., 2007 cited in Kumar, 2011) argue that “interviews 
are considered an intrusion into respondents’ private lives with regard to time allocated and level 
of sensitivity of questions asked”; therefore, a high standard of ethical considerations should be 
maintained. He further asserts that ethical issues are an important aspect to be considered at all 
stages of the research process. Furthermore, Kumar (2011:218) adds that times have changed and 
that “the way each profession serves society is continuously changing in accordance with society’s 
needs and expectations; therefore, the ethical codes governing the manner in which a service is 
determined also needs [sic] to change.” This essentially means that researchers need to be aware 
of the code of conduct ‘prevalent at that point in time’, as Kumar (2011:218) states that “what has 
been considered ethical in the past may not be so judged at present, and what is ethical now may 
not remain so in the future”. 
Ethical issues were rigorously considered in this research study as my research topic touched on a 
very sensitive issue which most people are not comfortable talking about. Informed consent forms 
were issued to participants before the commencement of the interviews (see Annexure A). Most 
importantly, the interviews were conducted in the presence of a counselor from the University of 
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KwaZulu-Natal who would assist in situations where any respondent appeared to experience 
trauma. 
 
4.7.2 Procedures followed: a personal perspective 
When conducting a research study, one cannot simply enter into a chosen research site and go 
about one’s business without following the correct procedures. This includes seeking permission 
from the gatekeeper, among others. Gatekeepers are those “formal and informal authorities who 
control access to a site” (Neuman, 2004:441). Such gatekeepers may be “a thug at a street corner, 
a school principal, or an owner of a brothel” (Neuman, 2004: 441.) 
Gaining access to the research site was quite a challenge because the gatekeepers who were 
members of the Mpumalanga Taxi Association took long to respond to my request to conduct the 
research study among minibus drivers operating from the Mpumalanga taxi rank. I was sent from 
pillar to post, having to explain the purpose and aim of my research over and over. Finally, when 
I was close to giving up, they accepted my request and granted me the required permission. I was 
subsequently received with open arms, as members of the Association finally acknowledged that 
the topic was important and would shed light on the conflicting parties in the taxi industry. I sat 
down with all the Association members and discussed what the research entailed, how the data 
were going to be gathered, how many participants were needed, and whether I would need any 
additional assistance.  
Taxi drivers of minibus taxis who were deemed appropriate were identified with the assistance of 
Association members and interviewed of their own free will. First, they were given a thorough and 
clear explanation of the research study. The informed consent declaration was then read out to 
them, after which each participant signed this letter. None of the study participants were coerced. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted in Mpumalanga township at the end of August 2016.   
 
4.7.3 Informed consent 
“In every discipline it is considered unethical to collect information without the knowledge of 
participants and their expressed willingness and informed consent” (Kumar, 2011:220). Bailey 
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(1978:384) further explains that asking for participants’ informed consent “is probably the most 
common method in medical and social research.” 
According to the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects (1979 cited in 
Kumar, 2011:220), “all informed consent procedures must meet three criteria: participants must 
be competent to give consent; sufficient information must be provided to allow for a reasoned 
decision; and consent must be voluntary and un-coerced”. 
The above mentioned steps were followed in this research study. All the participants were 
competent enough to give consent. They were given enough information and were made aware of 
the purpose of the study in order to make a decision whether they would like to take part in the 
study or not. The participants were also informed of the data collection procedures and of the tools 
and instruments to be used for the purpose of collecting data. They were made aware that the 
interviews would be recorded and that all the recordings would be stored in secret where only the 
researcher would have access to them. The participants were also made aware that their 
participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw their participation from the study should 
they encounter uncomfortable situations during the data collection process. 
The researcher assured each participant of the right to confidentiality and anonymity throughout 
the data collection process and in terms of the reporting and dissemination of the research. The 
respondents were made aware that none of the information they shared with the researcher would 
be used for any purpose other than research data. They were also assured that they would be 
allocated pseudonyms that would be used throughout the study report so that they would not be 
identified by their responses by anyone who might read the report.   
 
4.8 Limitations of the study and challenges faced by the researcher 
One limitation had to be carefully examined so that the validity and reliability of the study were 
not compromised.  
Another limitation was the relatively small scope of the study. Although the trustworthiness of this 
study can in no way brought into question, the researcher acknowledges that the sample group was 
limited and one-sided to a certain extent, because the researcher conducted interviews with taxi 
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drivers only as eliciting their views regarding taxi violence was the focus of the study. However, 
the findings of the study may have been enriched if other major role players, such as members of 
the public and taxi owners, had been interviewed as well. In this way the findings could have been 
triangulated (Neuman, 2004:136) and this would have enhanced the validity of the findings. But, 
given the sensitive and volatile nature of the role players involved in the topic under investigation 
it was, for safety reasons, deemed prudent to refrain from extending the investigation too widely. 
Obtaining the permission of the gatekeeper to conduct the study was a major challenge and there 
were times when the researcher felt that field work was not going to happen at all. This study 
taught the researcher to exercise the principle of perseverance. First, permission by the members 
of the Mpumalanga Taxi Association had to be obtained. This was a time consuming process as 
they first had to take matters to a higher office in Pietermaritzburg where the Chairman was to 
make an overall decision and then get back to the researcher via telephonic communication.   
The researcher did not receive any communication from them for over five weeks. Eventually the 
researcher decided to go back to the office based in Mpumalanga township and to check if the 
request to conduct the study using taxi drivers as the study participants had been accepted or not. 
Upon arrival, the researcher was informed that such things take time. However, an apology was 
offered for not getting back to the researcher earlier, followed by permission to interview the 
drivers. However, the researcher again had to wait for the permission letter for another four weeks 
which was frustrating as the Ethics Committee of the university had been waiting for this letter for 




This chapter was designed to offer an analysis of the methodology applied in this research study. 
It also presented justification for using a qualitative approach and highlighted the value of and the 






DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the findings pertaining to the study that was conducted to investigate the transition 
of taxi violence in the Mpumalanga township are presented, analyzed and discussed with reference 
to data obtained from semi-structured open-ended interviews. The researcher did multiple and 
thorough readings of the recorded transcripts; thereafter, the researcher organized the data 
according to themes. The following themes emerged after reading the transcripts:  
 Reasons for entering the industry 
 Transition of taxi violence 
 Root causes of taxi violence 
 Perpetrators of taxi violence 
 The role of political parties 
 Challenges faced by the industry 
 Challenges taxi drivers face with their employers (taxi owner) 
 Challenges they face with passengers 
 Fear for their lives 
 Their future in the industry. 
 
The names used in the subsequent discussion of the data analysis are not the real names of the 
study participants.  Moreover, the responses of the taxi drivers had to be translated into English.  
Every effort was made to retain the original, authentic responses of the participants. The total 
number of participants was 15. 
 
5.2 Reasons for entering the industry 
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According to the findings of this study, twelve of the interviewed drivers of minibus taxis in the 
Mpumalanga Taxi Association joined the taxi industry as a result of lack of employment 
opportunities. One of the respondents reported to have joined the industry due to the death of both 
parents while another one of the divers reported to have joined the taxi industry as a result of health 
reasons that forced him to leave the company he had previously worked for before joining the taxi 
industry. Two of the drivers reported to have joined the industry as a result of poor financial 
backgrounds which forced them to leave school and join the taxi industry as a means of survival. 
For instance, Sibongiseni, who was 27 years old and had been in the taxi industry for five years 
said:  
“My parents did not have enough money to pay for my tertiary education. I decided 
to obtain a driver’s license and drive taxis instead so I could learn more about the 
industry and one day become an owner.” 
Syabonga had this to say: 
“I completed Matric (Grade 12); my parents did not have enough money to help me 
further my education. I stayed at home doing nothing for two years. It was painful 
watching my peers get ahead in life so I decided to get driver’s license and become 
a taxi driver.”  
Although several situations have developed for Black people with major political changes 
occurring since 1994, redundancy has virtually doubled and some individuals who struggled under 
the apartheid regime now miserably face the same fate as continuing and increasing levels of 
unemployment still remain a major challenge. South Africa is considered to be among the countries 
with the highest unemployment rates and this phenomenon continues to plague the country in this 
current democratic dispensation. Hundreds and thousands of South Africans are illiterate, live in 
slum areas and are stricken by poverty and unemployment (Malakwe, 2012). “For almost half a 
century, Black people have been subject to a deliberate mediocre education, labour laws that 
prohibited their progression, business regulations that outlawed many forms of firm ownership, 
and laws that kept them from living in or doing business in the metropolitan areas that were at the 
center of commerce” (Malakwe, 2012:5). The lack of employment opportunities forced the 
majority of South Africans to seek other forms of employment since ‘better’ jobs were not given 
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to Black people of African descent. They were given jobs that the upper class did not want to do 
such as domestic work, gardening, driving and coal mining. For instance, Nhlanhla had this to say: 
“South Africa does not have enough job opportunities for Black people so this is why I 
decided to become a taxi driver. It is very easy to get this kind of job if you are Black.” 
Thembokwakhe, who has been a taxi driver since 1989, commented as follows: 
“Lack of employment opportunities forced me to join this industry. I had to find a way 
to survive and provide for my children rather than to sit at home and do nothing.” 
Sandile also said: 
“I joined this industry because there are no jobs for people like us in South Africa; Black 
people are always deprived when it comes to job opportunities. Even though we voted 
for change we still don’t see any changes. There are still no jobs.” 
  
Mzonjani, who had been in the taxi industry for ten years, felt the same: 
“The lack of employment opportunities led me to enter this industry.” 
 
Ntokozo, who had been a driver for almost twelve years said: 
“I could not find any other form of employment.” 
 
Zoras, who had been driving for twenty years, stated: 
“I could not find any other job so that forced me to join this industry. I had to do 
something to survive. I have a wife and children, they have to eat!” 
 
Sizwe, who was 29 and had been in this industry for five years, said: 
“I struggled finding a job; taxi driving was the first job I could find.” 
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The apartheid dispensation intensified the circumstances when people of African descent were 
deprived of economic participation grounded on class and race. As a result, unemployment rates 
were heightened due to the unequal distribution of resources and the unequal employment 
opportunities between different racial groups. “The manner of distributing resources in the 
previous dispensation served to benefit a single segment of the population, while excluding the 
rest, with the composition of the privileged population having evolved over time” (Seekings & 
Nattass, 2005 cited in Malakwe, 2012:24). The uneven distribution of resources resulted in 
heightened levels of poverty and unemployment for that fragment of individuals that were 
mistreated.  
However, unemployment reasons are not the only factors that prompted the participants to join the 
taxi industry. For instance, Mantolwane, who had been driving for eight years, had this to say: 
“I used to work for a meat company in Clerewood. My brothers and I worked for the same 
company and they soon got sick. The diagnosis was pneumonia. Caring family members 
told us to stop working as our health was endangered. I later got a job in one of the factories 
in Hammersdale, but the wages were too low and these factories threatened to close so I 
decided to become a driver.” 
These empirical findings are consistent with those of Motsoetsa (2004), whose research revealed 
that South Africa’s political transition in 1994 was accompanied by many economic challenges 
that had their roots in an earlier dispensation. This resulted in mass unemployment at just the time 
democracy took root. “Retrenchments, relocations, and factory closures became a feature of the 
industry as factories tried to compete with imports coming from China and Taiwan. The former 
industrial decentralization zone of Hammarsdale, and Mpumalanga as the township that served it, 
were caught up in these trends and were not exempt from their impact” (Motsoetsa, 2004:4). 
 
Apart from these above-mentioned issues, other reasons that related to family structures forced 
some drivers to leave their comfort zone, abandon their dreams and find a form of work in order 
to survive. For instance, Sibusiso, a 30-year -old driver who had been driving for nine years, had 
this to say: 
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“Both my parents passed away, leaving behind myself who is the oldest and my three 
younger siblings. We had no one to turn to, so as the oldest I had to do something. There 
was no time and no money for me to go and study for a better job; I had to find a way for 
us to survive. I begged relatives for money to get a driver’s license, I then looked for a job 
as a taxi driver and I got it.” 
 
The findings of this study with regard to the reasons that made the majority of the drivers enter the 
minibus taxi industry comply with the conflict theory which states that “the key to human history 
is class conflict” (Henslin, 2013:22). Karl Marx reached this conclusion after he had observed the 
industrial revolution that transformed all parts of Europe. His conclusion was based upon the high 
levels of poverty, the high unemployment rates among the poor as well as the unequal distribution 
of resources between the individuals of lower and higher classes. It was from these insights that 
the conflict theory was developed. 
 
5.3 Transition of taxi violence 
 
The empirical findings of this study revealed that there were different opinions and attitudes 
towards the nature and extent of taxi violence in the new democratic dispensation in South Africa. 
Thirteen of the drivers felt that the levels of violent conflict in the industry had increased when 
compared to the 1980s and the 1990s. Only two of the drivers that were interviewed felt that it had 
not changed at all. For instance, Sibusiso, who had been driving for 12 years, did not think that the 
nature and extent of taxi violence had changed. This is what he had to say: 
“I cannot say that taxi violence has changed that much when compared to the times of 
apartheid. The worst part is that the Government and transport ministers are failing to 
intervene. Things were much better when Bheki Cele was still minister of transport.” 
Another driver, Thembinkosi, had this to say: 
“Violence in the taxi industry has not changed; it is still the same even today. People are 
still being killed. They were killed before, there were too many shootings and it is still 
happening even now.” 
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These findings are consistent with the findings of Harris (2003) whose research revealed that ‘the 
more things change, the more they stay the same’. His research revealed that even in the democratic 
dispensation our country is still marked by violent conflicts in the taxi industry. Harris (2003) 
argues that in the taxi industry, old patterns that existed still exist even today.  
There were other drivers who felt that taxi violence had transitioned. Ntokozo, who had been in 
the taxi industry for almost twelve years, commented as follows: 
“The current incidents of taxi violence are very bad. What makes it worse is the fact that 
Government officials and traffic inspectors have their taxis operating with different taxi 
associations. The numbers of taxi violence have gone up - taxi violence has gone worse! It 
will never end because of corruption. Government officials are corrupt and they keep 
introducing new tactics of further perpetrating this violence.” 
Mzonjani also said: 
“The situation is bad now, in fact it’s worse! If I remember correctly, violent cars [sic] used 
to operate back in the day, and owners would attack one another with phagas and 
knobkirries. Pangas were famous during those days. Today they shoot you! One bullet and 
you’re out!” 
Nkosi also said that taxi violence had transitioned in the following way: 
“Long ago, the incidents of taxi violence were very few. Government should be blamed for 
the increased levels of taxi violence that we now have. Before 1994, there were vehicle 
certificates called ‘infinites’. With those certificates, a driver could transport passengers 
from Durban to Johannesburg and still be able to work there transporting people. 
Government then decided to do away with these certificates. Boundaries were created for 
taxis, and this fueled taxi violence.”  
  Nhlanhla also had this to say: 
“It was better before, now it is very bad.” 
Sandile was also concerned, offering the following comment: 
“Taxi violence in the past was more about taxi routes, now it is about hate and revenge.” 
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The empirical findings obtained in this study revealed that the majority of the respondents seemed 
to think that there was a transition in taxi-related conflicts. The state of extensive taxi violence in 
Mpumalanga township can also be ascribed to “the long periods spent in the fight for the liberation 
of South Africa from the apartheid Government” (Mkhize, 2012:78). The levels of violent conflicts 
in the taxi industry therefore drastically escalated; these findings are consistent with the finding of 
Dugard (2001) whose research revealed that the current incidents of taxi violence “are more 
prevalent, more regionalized and more criminal in nature”. Her research also revealed that this 
form of crime is now “complex and creative in nature”. In the democratic dispensation, taxi 
violence is “characterized by threats, brutal attacks, illegal dealings, assaults and assassinations”. 
The findings in this study also revealed that Government was seen as the cause of the escalated 
levels of violence. This is explained by the conflict theory which maintains that all societies are in 
constant transition and that such active changes often cause conflict amongst several individuals. 
Furthermore, this theory also postulates that if all groups were equal and shared the same amount 
of resources, such conflicts and battles would be replaced by cooperation and negotiation. 
 
5.4 Root causes of taxi violence 
According to the empirical findings in this research study, the root causes of taxi violence are 
known by all the stakeholders in the industry as well as outsiders. This study revealed that issues 
such as the contestation of lucrative routes, greed and poor communication skills were seen as 
among some of the root causes of taxi violence. For instance, Ntokozo, who had been in this 
industry for almost twelve years, had this to say: 
“Greed is the cause of taxi violence. They don’t want to see another individual prosper in 
this industry. When one owner fails to properly manage his business, he becomes jealous 
and kills the one who is doing well. In Mpumalanga township, many people have died who 
were not even involved in anything dishonest. They were killed just because they were 
doing well.” 
Sibusiso concurred, saying the following: 
“…not granting other people in the industry a chance to own taxis, lack of communication 
and greed are the biggest problems that we are faced with because they cause violence. 
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Greed is the biggest problem though! There are situations where you find one person with 
five taxis while the other person only has one. This person with five taxis will find a way 
to prevent others to add a second taxi to his name while creating another way that will 
favour him in adding a sixth taxi.”    
This finding complies with the conflict theory which postulates that “superior groups will use 
coercion, constraint, and even force to help control those people who are voluntarily loyal to the 
laws and rules they have made.”  Tibbetts (2012) supports this statement and adds that laws are 
thus created and enforced in a way that superior groups can suppress inferior groups. For instance, 
Sizwe angrily contribute to this idea: 
“The Taxi Board in Pietermaritzburg is the cause of the violence and the unresolved issues 
of contestation of taxi routes. Here in Mpumalanga township two associations operate; that 
is the Mpumalanga and the Pinetown Taxi Association. Both these associations were given 
permits. You often find taxis from Umbumbulu, Umlazi, and Clermont transporting 
passengers from Mpumalanga township that work or shop in Pinetown. We do not want 
this! They should use their own routes and leave Mpumalanga drivers to transport 
Mpumalanga passengers coming to and from Pinetown.” 
 
This finding is consistent with that of Moyake (2006), who states that transport officials have a 
habit of allocating routes unlawfully. These corrupt officials may allocate one route to two 
different taxi associations, which naturally results in much conflict and bloody clashes.  
Mzonjani had this to say while shaking his finger emphatically: 
“Greed is the main cause; if they [owners] would stop being greedy things would run 
smoothly in this industry.” 
Nkosi agreed. He said:  
“We as Black people don’t know how to negotiate. We don’t want to sit down and negotiate 
on how we can resolve issues that do not make us happy. If one person makes a suggestion 
and they refuse to acknowledge his suggestion, then someone will die. The person or the 
people who refused his suggestion will die.” 
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Sizwe also had this to say with a smug look on his face: 
“…the loading practices that we sometimes use are a problem. We steal each other’s 
passengers and we rush to load passengers even when we know it is not our turn. This 
causes a lot of conflict and it becomes even worse when owners get involved.” 
This finding is consistent with a finding by Fourie (2003), whose research discovered that the 
poaching of passengers as well as some of the loading practices that are used in the taxi ranks are  
unprincipled and are among the many contributing factors to the ongoing taxi violence in our 
country.  
Zoras had this to say: 
“The contestation of taxi routes as well as the delays in issuing permits is the cause of taxi 
violence because it creates chaos; it creates confusion and problems.”  
Nhlanhla corroborated this statement as follows:  
“…dishonest officials in high places at national level are the cause of taxi violence because 
they don’t do what they are expected to do.” 
Mantolwane blamed taxi owners by stating: 
“…disagreement between owners is the cause of violence in this industry.” 
Thembi said: 
“Money is the root of all evil. This is why some people even go and ply routes which belong 
to other associations.” 
These findings are consistent with those of Dugard (2001), whose research found that greed, taxi 
routes and rank space were the root causes of taxi violence. Many incidents of violence in the 
South African minibus taxi industry erupt as a result of rival taxi association members battling for 
lucrative turf.  Permits are issued to drivers allowing them to operate specific routes and this is 
done in compliance with the law. However, some drivers cross their boundaries when they use 
routes that were not allocated to them. Acts of intimidation and violent confrontation take place 
almost every day at South African taxi ranks among owners and operators from rival taxi 
associations. The ongoing violent confrontations in the South African taxi industry occur as a result 
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of drivers who navigate routes where they have not been permitted to trade. When a driver decides 
to trespass on a route that is not his, it ends up in a bloody clash and such acts are responsible for 
the increase in taxi violence. 
 
5.5 Perpetrators of taxi violence 
According to the drivers of minibus taxis, taxi violence in the taxi industry is perpetrated by the 
same individuals. In other words, known stakeholders in the taxi industry initiate this form of 
violence. This study revealed that owner associations are alleged to be the predominant 
perpetrators of taxi violence.  
Sibongiseni had this to say: 
“…taxi owners; it is not us drivers. We have no say in anything. Our job is to make 
money, that’s all.”   
Taxi association executives have been identified as the main perpetrators of taxi violence as they 
sometimes promise their drivers lucrative routes, even though such routes have not been allocated 
to their association or business. These executives do this even when the association is still new to 
that area, when the association has not been issued a permit from the Government, or even when 
the association does not have the correct permit. 
Zoras said: 
“…it is owners of associations who do not see eye to eye.” 
Sibusiso had this to say: 
“…in this industry it is taxi owners who are the cause of taxi violence.” 
Nhlanhla had this to say: 
“…corrupt and dishonest owners that fight over routes perpetrate taxi violence.” 
Siyabonga also stated: 
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“It is taxi owners who are also members of the taxi board. They should be 
controlling the system in order to prevent violence from happening; instead, they 
are doing the opposite.” 
It was revealed by this research study that the main perpetrators of taxi violence were perceived to 
be owners who fight to use the same routes. There is a strong surge to use routes that are lucrative, 
which causes conflict and violence. This finding is consistent with a finding by Dugard (2001), 
whose research revealed that “the emergent taxi industry offered Blacks one of the few 
opportunities of earning a living with the possibility, however remote, of becoming rich, and was 
soon flooded with associations of owners, some of who made large profits. While some were able 
to 'strike it lucky', for the most part the industry was characterized by exploitation and aggressive 
competition between taxi owners attempting to ply the same routes” (Dugard, 2001:11). 
 
5.6 The role of political parties 
According to the findings of this study, the views when it came to the influence that political parties 
might have on perpetuating violence in the taxi industry were fairly similar. Fourteen of the drivers 
believed that political parties did not have any influence on perpetuating taxi violence, whereas 
only one of the drivers who were interviewed believed political parties had some influence on the 
ongoing taxi wars. Ntokozo, who had been driving for almost twelve years, said:  
“Yes, political parties do have an influence on further perpetrating taxi 
violence in our industry. Even though their influence may not be too 
transparent for everyone to see, to a certain extent they do have an influence.”   
Other respondents did not believe that political parties had any influence. For instance, 
Thembokakhe, who had been driving since 1989, had this to say: 
“No. Political parties do not contribute to taxi violence. Even our local council does 
not own a taxi and is not part of the taxi association. If maybe he owned a taxi and 
was a stakeholder, then I’m definitely sure that there would be chaos.”  
Zoras, who had been driving for twenty years, also believed that political parties had no influence 
on further perpetrating taxi violence. This is what he had to say:  
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“In our area political parties have not been involved; I would be telling lies if I said 
they did.” 
Mantolwane, who had been driving for eight years, had this to say: 
“ No. They do not have an influence; taxi bosses fight on their own.” 
This study established that political parties did not have an influence on taxi violence and that the 
individuals who did have an impact on perpetuating this form of violence were known by everyone 
in the industry. This finding was consistent with the preliminary report on taxi violence that was 
issued by the Goldstone Commission in August 1993. 
 
5.7 Challenges faced by the taxi industry 
According to the findings of this research study, all fifteen of the minibus taxi drivers that were 
interviewed reported that there were some challenges that the minibus taxi industry faced that 
hindered its progress. For instance, Zoras said: 
“…there is no order in this industry. Sometimes you find that a person has ten taxis 
while others only have two. This is a major challenge because it causes conflict and 
uncertainties.” 
Sizwe had this to say: 
“Passengers commonly complain of arriving late for work, and they have to stand 
in long queues waiting for taxis. The biggest challenge faced by this industry is that 
we do not have enough taxis. This is due to the fact that drivers are prevented from 
also owning taxis in this industry.”  
Nkosi commented on the lack of managerial skills of taxi owners: 
“Most of the owners are uneducated. They manage their business according to what 
they think is right and not what they know to be right.” 
This finding is consistent with a finding and recommendation of the NTTT that identified the need 
for skills training and capacity building within the South African minibus taxi industry. Initiatives 
in this regard existed even before the release of the NTTT’s findings; however, it was found that 
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those initiatives lacked co-ordination and that there was a complete lack of monitoring and 
evaluation. This finding is also consistent with a finding by Jefthas (2002), whose research report 
stated that an all-inclusive approach needed to be implemented to guarantee effective capacity 
building and skills training so that practical outcomes could be achieved. 
It was revealed that this industry was not only challenged by a lack of skills training and capacity 
building, but that there were other issues as well. For instance, Sbongiseni had this to say: 
“There are many challenges in this industry such as road accidents and violence.”  
In 2005, the Department of Transport made a public announcement stating that “South African 
municipalities will take control of the minibus taxi ranks and their management. Taxi ranks and 
routes will no longer be controlled by associations and mother bodies.”  With the inception of the 
Taxi Recapitalization Program, the Department of Transport hoped to improve road safety and 
decrease violence. However, the goal has not been achieved yet. According to Baloyi (2012), “the 
situation is the extreme opposite of what was aimed at; in terms of violence and road safety, 
minibus taxi accidents are escalating.” Minibus taxi accident reports have revealed that most 
accidents involved the new vehicles as described in the National Land Transition Transport Act 
(Act no. 22 of 2000). Allegedly, Toyota Quantum vehicles were involved in most vehicle 
accidents. Baloyi (2012) claimed that most of the reported accidents were fatal given that the 
Quantum vehicles would ‘explode’ on impact.   
On numerous occasions it was claimed that “the Government must just forget about taking over 
the taxi ranks and routes”. This was pointed out by the General Secretary of the Soweto Taxi 
Services, Mrs Molefe (2006 cited in Moyake, 2006). This finding is consistent with that of Moyake 
(2006), whose research found that “various associations and most of its membership do not believe 
that the Government can have bona fide intentions regarding the issues facing the taxi industry” 
(Moyake, 2006:93). It was also mentioned by the drivers who were interviewed that association 
members sometimes create situations where the Government will be prevented from ‘interfering’ 
with the taxi industry. For instance, Mzonjani had this to say: 
“Owners in the taxi industry are selfish…they are ruled by greed and selfishness. 
Government is trying to intervene but fails because everything the Government tries 
to implement is ignored.” 
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Sibusiso also offered his opinion: 
“Greed is a big challenge in this industry. If taxi owners were not so greedy we 
would see fewer challenges and more changes.” 
Mantolwane said: 
“Association members do not see eye to eye; there are always disagreements.” 
This finding complies with the conflict theory which states that conflict mostly occurs as a result 
of opposition when one group’s interests are promoted, protected and put into law. 
Syabonga also had this to say: 
“Municipality buses pose a threat to the industry.” 
This finding also complies with the conflict theory which argues that social conflict is the struggle 
that occurs between divisions of society over valued resources. Conflict theorists “stress that 
society is composed of groups that are competing with one another for scarce resources” (Heslin, 
2013:20). The bus and taxi industries have been rivals since the apartheid dispensation and this 
has not changed even in the more recent democratic dispensation. Both these industries are always 
competing for passengers. In situations where violent conflicts erupt in the taxi industry, the bus 
industry benefits. The ongoing violence in the taxi industry poses a threat not only to drivers and 
owners, but also to commuters, and prevents opportunities for growth. This was also evident in the 
responses obtained from the respondents. For instance, Syabonga had this to say: 
“Taxi violence is a very big problem in this industry. There are always violent 
conflicts over taxi routes, and we don’t ever know if it will ever end! Not only is it 
a big problem for the taxi industry, but for us drivers as well. During these violent 
conflicts we have to stay at home and not go to work. We lose out on money and 
we are unable to provide for our families.” 
Various issues pose a threat to the taxi industry. For instance, Ntokozo had this to say: 
“As drivers we lose our jobs due to the shortage of jobs in South Africa. People are 
being retrenched and factories are being closing down. We rely on these people; 
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our income is dependent on them. When they lose their jobs we also lose out as 
there is no one to transport. No passengers, no work. No work, no pay!” 
This finding is consistent with the research conducted by Motsoesta (2004), who found that “in 
1999 alone, 180 000 workers lost their jobs through factory closures, relocations or retrenchments” 
(Motsoetsa, 2004:4). This occurred particularly in Hammersdale, which is adjacent to 
Mpumalanga township. In addition, her findings also revealed that “since 1994, approximately 
500 000 jobs have been lost in South Africa” (COSATU, cited in Motsoetsa, 2004:4). “In Durban, 
by 1998, it was estimated that 23% of manufacturing jobs had been lost” (Sisters, 1998 cited in 
Motsoetsa, 2004:4).  During or after labour strikes, when people are retrenched from work, it 
usually means that they will have to stay at home and wait for their retrenchment payouts. During 
times when these masses of people stay at home, the taxi industry suffers as there a fewer people 
left to offer their transportation services to.  
 
5.8 Conflict between taxi drivers and employers (taxi owners) 
According to the findings of this research study, eight of the minibus taxi drivers that were 
interviewed reported that they faced numerous challenges when working with their employers, 
whereas the other seven drivers reported no challenges when working with their employers. For 
instance, Thembi, who was the only female driver operating from the Mpumalanga taxi rank, had 
this to say: 
“This is my third year working with the same employer and I have not encountered 
any challenges in my working relationship with him.” 
Sandile also had this to say: 
“I do not have any problems with my current employer.” 
Sibusiso and Nhlanhla concurred, stating respectively: 
“I don’t face any challenges with my boss. We work well” and “I don’t face any 
difficulty when working with my employer.” 
However, things were not running smoothly between all the drivers and their employers. For 
instance, Sibongiseni had this to say:  
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“We usually fight over payments. Owners do not care about us. If the taxi has been 
involved in a road accident or a shootout, the first thing he will ask is ‘How bad is 
the damage to my vehicle?’ They have no personal regard for us.” 
Mzonjani also had this to say: 
“Owners like to be treated like bosses. They think they are kings and we should 
bow down to them. Their word is final and you can’t disagree with what they’ve 
said; if you try to challenge them they will fire you on the spot. This thing is very 
similar to having a soccer ball. If the ball is mine, it is mine and if I don’t want you 
to play with it you will not play. An owner will fire you whether you are doing your 
job or not. Should he wake up one morning and decide that he no longer wants you 
working for him, then you are gone and there’s nothing that you can do about it. 
We can’t even take these people to the CCMA.” 
Zoras and Sizwe had the following to say respectively: 
“I often have a problem of being dismissed from work without a valid reason and 
with no warning”, and “They don’t want to listen to us; they want us to listen to 
them instead, even when they are wrong.” 
Ntokozo concurred, saying: 
“…they don’t want to understand that we also have our own personal problems but 
they always expect us to understand theirs. We work too many hours on a given 
day; long hours for very low wages. You are never told what your knockoff times 
are. When you try to voice out your grievances, they tell you to leave the vehicle, 
another person will fill your space.” 
Both Syabongsa and Nkosi commented on financial dissatisfaction, saying respectively: 
“Our employers in this industry don’t want to give us a raise”, and “The problem 
with our employers is that they are never satisfied! They always feel that the money 
they make is not enough.” 
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5.9 Challenges they face with passengers 
According to the empirical findings of this research study, only one of the drivers that were 
interviewed reported not having any challenges when dealing with the public. However, fourteen 
of the drivers that were interviewed reported numerous challenges when working with the public, 
which often caused conflict between the driver and passengers. Sometimes these conflicts occurred 
among the passengers themselves. However, the challenges/problems were not all the same for 
each driver, and some were really minor problems. For instance, Zoras had this to say: 
“There are not too many problems I encounter with the passengers. It is just minor 
problems like fighting over change. They often come with R100 notes in the early 
hours of the morning and I usually don’t have loose change or coins at this time. 
They become agitated and start quarreling.” 
Not all the drivers experienced the same kind of problems when providing their transport services 
to the community. Some of the problems that passengers bring often affect the manner in which a 
driver provides his services. For instance, Mzonjani had little respect for most passengers, as he 
stated: 
“Passengers…those ones are the worst! They are very rude. They forget to leave 
their problems at home and then they come and take their problems out on us. Their 
heads are hard like concrete!” 
Sibongiseni agreed, saying: 
Passengers come from their homes with their problems and they take them out on 
us. When they are late they want you to speed and place us in positions where we 
are forced to break all the rules of the road. Their main concern is getting to work 
on time. When the traffic authorities catch us speeding, we are left on our own, the 
passengers we were speeding for forget to support us and vouch for us when we get 
tickets. They don’t even help us pay for those tickets. If you drive slowly on the 
road when they are late, they fight with you.”  
This finding is consistent with the public comments that were made by a women’s organization 
and that were published as part of the submissions by the Minister of Transport (Omar, 2000) give 
correct citation referring the to the commission of inquiry into taxi violence in 2000. These 
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comments also included that taxis broke all the rules of the road. However, from the empirical data 
that were obtained, one could not ignore the finding that passengers sometimes put the drivers in 
tenuous situations where they felt compelled to speed beyond the legal limit. 
Ntokozo felt strongly about the public’s disrespect for taxi drivers. He vehemently stated the 
following:  
“Passengers do not respect us! They’ve never respected us and they never will. 
They regard us as hooligans; they forget that we are respected husbands, fathers 
and grandfathers in our homes! They forget that we are human. We have well 
educated drivers in this industry – people who, due to the unavailability of other 
respected jobs, end up as drivers. Once passengers see you behind the wheel in a 
taxi they just see a hooligan. We only get respect from our family members who 
understand our struggle.” 
This finding is explained by the labeling theory which highlights that, in some circumstances, 
every individual shows behaviour that can be called or labeled deviant. Hebert Mead, who was 
one of the forerunners of this approach, explains that “self-awareness is created in the individual 
through interplay between him and his environment” (Knutsson, 1978:8). Frank Tannenbaum, 
another forerunner of the labeling approach, also stated that when the behaviour of a certain 
individual is defined as evil, that definition is then transferred directly to the individual. They are 
then described as evil. According to Tannenbaum (ibid.), procedures taken by the community 
using its control agencies have results that are opposite to those initially intended. “The harder 
they [control agencies] work to reform the evil, the greater the evil grows under their hands” 
(Knutsson, 1978:18).  The issue of the disrespect of the the public for taxi drivers is exacerbated 
by the public’s view that taxi driving is a menial job that is mostly accepted as a last resort when 
other jobs are not available. The following respondent also echoed this perception: 
“The problem with passengers is that they don’t have respect and they come here 
in the morning in anger and want to fight with everyone. They take this anger out 
on the driver or on another passenger. They fight inside the taxi, sometimes when 
they want to be dropped off at a certain taxi stop they don’t properly pitch their 
voices and this causes a lot of conflict inside the taxi.” 
92 
This finding is consistent with a finding by Dressel and Neuman (2003 in Jefthas, 2002:40) who 
state in their research report that “conflict is a normal and unavoidable part of human interaction”. 
These authors define conflict as a “process during which two or more conflicting parties come into 
opposition over differences or perceived differences regarding positions, interests, values or 
needs” (ibid.). However, they further argue that if conflict is perceived constructively, it paves a 
way for change and development.  The finding emanating from Sibusiso’s comment is also 
consistent with a finding by Meyer, van der Merwe and Kawa (1986 cited in Jefthas, 2002: 40), 
whose research proclaims that “…the problem does not lie in the presence of conflict, but in the 
manner in which conflict is handled”. The above statement implies that one can argue that, if there 
is an unresolved issue, it will later on cause further conflict. “If the conflict is handled in a negative 
and destructive way, it may end in violence and violence is the extreme manifestation of conflict” 
(Dressel & Newman, 2001:22). 
 
Nkosi also mirrored the view that taxi drivers are inferior because they do a menial job. He stated: 
“Ninety per cent of the passengers have this perception that a person who drives a 
taxi is someone that is rude, uneducated and stubborn. When there is a 
misunderstanding between a passenger and the driver, passengers quickly put the 
blame on the driver without carefully assessing the situation.” 
Thembokwakhe introduced the issue of coerced overloading and dissatisfaction with taxi fares. 
His comments were as follows: 
“A taxi is meant to carry fifteen passengers seated; but some passengers will want 
their children to sit on their laps causing overload. They offer to pay for the fare but 
are sometimes short of R2, R3 or even R5. Children from three years and above 
should pay but their parents do not want to pay for them. Passengers give us 
problems.”  
Thembinkosi also found the attitude of passengers problematic and abrasive, hinting at their 
insistence on taxis carrying more passengers than legally acceptable. He had this to say: 
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“Passengers are problematic. They cause too many problems for us. If I were to 
count them one by one we would never finish. These people are very rude. Too 
many problems!” 
Thembi also addressed the issue of coerced overloading. Also, his comments addressed the 
awareness of taxi drivers that they are responsible for the safety of their passengers, as he stated 
the following: 
Passengers like to overload, especially when they are late. There are always 
quarrels over change; these people come with R100 notes, R200 notes in the 
morning when we have just started working. They refuse to pay for their children 
who are above the age of two. They come with planks, doors, door frames and 
demand to put these things inside the taxi. If you refuse they think you have 
something against them or you are ‘full of yourself’ [arrogant]. They always fail to 
understand that these items are not allowed inside the taxi as the taxi is for 
transporting passengers and such items can injure the passengers should an accident 
happen.” 
Sandile simply stated: 
“Working with people is a very big challenge. Passengers give us problems.” 
Mantolwane echoed other drivers’ comments that passengers were rude when he stated the 
following: 
“Passengers here in Mpumalanga township and all around are rude. They are all the 
same!” 
However, as stated before, not all drivers faced challenges when providing their transport services 
to the public. For instance, Nhlanhla had this to say: 
“I don’t encounter any challenges when working with passengers. I always try to 
work with them and not against them.” 
Clearly, an attitude of tolerance and consideration for others may go a long way in smoothing 
ruffled feathers when conflict situations arise between taxi drivers and their passengers. 
94 
 
5.10 Fear for their lives 
According to the empirical data of this study, one finding was that taxi drivers were scared when 
taxi violence erupted at taxi ranks. Taxi violence has claimed the lives of many drivers, owners 
and passengers. Drivers who become victims of this crime are usually not involved in these 
conflicts; they get caught up in the fight that is not theirs. For instance, Sbongiseni had this to say: 
“…and we drivers are at a greater risk so I do fear for my life. When we are on the road 
ducking bullets, owners always get away scot free as they are safe in the comfort of their 
homes.” 
Sibusiso and Thembinkosi concurred. Fear was a constant companion not only in times of conflict, 
but also because of the daily threat of death on the roads. They stated the following respectively, 
their voices trembling: 
“…fear is always there. There are people who always target certain taxis and steal them. 
Accidents always happen on the roads. We are on the road all the time with fifteen 
passengers with the driver being the sixteenth. These people are all not insured; I am not 
ensured as a driver. Sometimes the driver is shot while the taxi is on the road with 
passengers inside”, and “I am scared all the time. These things are not nice. I am always 
scared thinking what would happen to my children should I die.” 
Thembi, the only female driver, had perhaps more reason to be scared. She had this to say: 
“…as a female driver in this township which is regarded as one of the townships in 
KwaZulu-Natal with the highest crime rates, yes I do get scared. So much has happened in 
this township - at this taxi rank. Sometimes we get held at gun point and vehicles are stolen. 
I get scared a lot when I transport passengers I do not know at night. 
 
5.11 Taxi drivers’ future in the industry 
 
In light of the conflict that has taken over the South African minibus taxi industry, it was important 
that this research study generated information from the drivers about their perceptions of their 
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future in this industry. It came as no surprise that fourteen of the taxi drivers that were interviewed 
reported that there was no future in the minibus taxi industry; it was just a matter of working to 
put food on the table. Only the female driver reported that the future for her seemed bright. For 
instance, Thembi had this to say with much confidence: 
“…therefore my future is bright because there will always be a need for taxis in 
South Africa.”   
Minibus taxis are a convenient mode of transportation for thousands of people to their different 
destinations. With the unequal distribution of resources and high unemployment rates, there will 
always be a great need for this mode of transportation for those who cannot afford to purchase and 
own private vehicles, which was perhaps best understood by the female driver who, interestingly, 
had also shown the most positive attitude towards her passengers. A high demand for transport 
means more money for taxi owners and drivers as well; hence one might perceive their future as 
being bright in the taxi industry. However, not all drivers felt that their future was bright in the taxi 
industry. For instance: Sibusiso had this to say with sadness written all over his face: 
“My future in this industry can only be bright if I were given a chance to own a 
taxi; if I could become self-employed within the industry and never have to chase 
employment opportunities.”  
Sbongiseni referred to the lack of training and the violence in the industry when he commented 
that his future was not bright.  He said the following: 
“There is no future in this industry. There is nothing that we learn, there are always 
conflicts and people getting killed. So I don’t think staying in this industry and 
becoming an owner will be a good decision for me to make.”  
Mzonjani concurred, saying: 
“If another opportunity existed elsewhere I would take it today! There is no future 
here; the money we make is just for electricity, groceries and airtime.” 
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Sibusiso, Mantolwane and Zoras all felt that opportunities in the industry were limited and that, if 
they had the chance, they would get out. Respectively, some with anger in their voices, they 
commented as follows:  
“Once I have accumulated enough money I will leave this industry. I do not plan to 
spend the rest of my days here”; “I am soon to leave this industry. There is no future 
here”; and “This is not a job; you can’t tell people that you are working if you are 
a taxi driver. This is just a ‘jumpstart’, a ‘stepping stone’ in life where you come 
here to make a few rand, and then leave; you go to get a better job. There is no 
professionalism here, no UIF, nothing!”. 
 
5.12 Suggestions for dealing with taxi violence  
The drivers of minibus taxis were asked to offer suggestions on what they thought should be done 
in an effort to curb taxi violence. The following suggestions were given by the drivers: 
 Develop strategies of anonymously reporting the perpetrators of taxi violence so that 
Government, together with the criminal justice system, can deal with them. 
 Provide skills training for both drivers and owners of minibus taxis so that they can be 
educated on how to successfully run a business and how to treat passengers. 
 Establish one regulatory structure at national level that will be a representative of all the 
drivers in both provincial and local levels. The drivers felt that there was too much 
confusion and violence in the industry and things would run smoothly if they had some 
formal body that would act as their ‘mouthpiece’ at national level. 
 Government should intervene on the matter of violence in the taxi industry. 
 There should be a limited number of ownership of taxis by association members. 
 Police officials should be prevented from becoming stakeholders in the taxi industry, as 
their involvement increases the levels of corruption and violence. 
 There should be awareness campaigns involving passenger’s/community members in the 
search for solutions to taxi driver and community conflicts. 
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The drivers of minibus taxis were mindful of the fact that there was much violence in the taxi 
industry and they all concurred that something needed to be done to put an end to the ongoing taxi 
violence. They were also in agreement that the Government needed to intervene on matters relating 




In this chapter, the empirical data were presented, discussed and analyzed using a thematic analysis 
approach. The emerging themes were constructed using chief topics that stood out within the data. 
By so doing, the transition of taxi violence in Mpumalanga township was explored. The transition 
was found to have intensified and its levels had escalated when compared to its previous lowered 
state. This transition and escalation of taxi violence was seen to affect the drivers and passengers 
when on the road or at taxi ranks. In addition, the findings revealed that the drivers of minibus 
taxis coped with taxi violence at the ranks and on the South African roads by carrying weapons 
inside their vehicles. This study also revealed that they defended themselves in groups should 
situations force them to. The feeling was clear that not much was done by the taxi owners to defend 
their drivers when they became victims of a fight that was in reality not their own. They felt they 
were caught in the middle between greedy and warring taxi owners and were helpless to defend 
themselves or to do anything about alleviating the situation. When given the drivers an opportunity 
to suggest what they thought should be done to address the issue of taxi violence in the community 
and in the country as a whole, they were extremely vocal and adamant that something should be 
done, as the majority saw no future for themselves in the taxi industry. These findings are presented 




CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
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The prime purpose of this study was to investigate the transition of taxi violence in a low-income 
urban community (i.e., Mpumalanga township) in South Africa. In order to accomplish this goal, 
it became obligatory to reach some essential objectives. The first was to determine the history and 
impact of the country’s political struggle as well as its history of violence and to establish how 
these phenomena were linked to the ongoing issue of taxi violence. This process assumed an 
optimal degree of significance during the literature review which was conducted for this thesis. 
Associated with the above effort, it became essential to reach a clear understanding of the historical 
development of the South African minibus taxi industry. Moreover, to be able to determine how 
taxi violence had transitioned in the new democratic dispensation in South Africa, it was important 
to first define and understand the root causes of this form of violence. Once these initial steps in 
the research process had been achieved, I was able to progress with the subsequent phases of the 
research – i.e., data collection, analysis and evaluation – in order to reach meaningful findings and 
draw significant conclusions. This chapter will present the conclusions and recommendations that 
resulted from this study.  
 
6.2 General conclusions 
A number of general conclusions were drawn in consideration of the following study objectives: 
 To describe and analyze the history of taxi violence in South Africa before and after the 
1994 democratic elections. 
 
 To investigate the development and transition that had taken place with reference to the 
Mpumalanga Taxi Association from 1994 to 2015. 
 
 To investigate the role of political parties and their influence on perpetuating taxi violence. 
 
 To determine if issues such as taxi routes, rank space, poaching of passengers, poverty, 




6.2.1 History of taxi violence in South Africa before and after the 1994 democratic elections 
This research study found that before the 1994 democratic election, Black people of African 
descent were prevented from participating in most economic activities of the country. Laws such 
as the Motor Carrier Transportation Act of 1930 prohibited taxi operators from transporting goods 
or passengers on South African roads if it was for financial gain and without having obtained 
permission from the South African Local Road Transportation Board. During those days, obtaining 
permits was very difficult. As a result, taxi owners decided to illegally conduct their business 
outside the authority of the Local Road Transportation Board. After the 1994 democratic elections, 
Black people were given new hope and a chance to finally participate in all of the country’s 
economic activities, including the ownership and operation of minibus taxis on the South African 
roads. The empirical findings were compliant with the conflict theory which argues that a ruling 
class tries to ‘control’ social order through rules and laws; however, these rules are always aimed 
at depriving minority groups’ opportunities to freely engage in or reap any fruitful resources of 
that country. This theory further argues that the ruling class is perceived as a cluster that spreads 
certain principles, views and social arrangements in order to gain more power, wealth and 
dominance. In addition, this theory further argues that the minority groups rebel and often refuse 
to follow these rules and laws, as they start recognizing the unequal distribution of power and 




6.2.2 Developments and transition that have taken place in the Mpumalanga Taxi Association  
        from 1994-2015 
The findings of this research study revealed that many developments and considerable transition 
had taken place in the Mpumalanga Taxi Association from 1994 to 2015. In 1994, service delivery 
by the Mpumalanga Taxi Association was very poor. There were not enough taxis, and people had 
to stand for long hours waiting for taxis. Rural parts of the township could not receive transport 
services as roads had not yet been developed. Taxi ranks in this area were not in good condition 
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and there were no shelters and lavatories for passengers and drivers. This study found that physical 
development of the taxi industry in this area was hindered as a result of conflict among taxi 
association members who fought for power and dominance.  This finding complies with the 
conflict theory which argues that those in power are usually concerned with “who benefits from a 
particular social arrangement” and how can those in higher positions maintain their ranking or 
place as well as continue to reap benefits from the minorities (Tischler (1983). The findings also 
confirmed that, between 2000 and 2015, the Mpumalanga Taxi Association had taken a stand and 
insisted on the development of the transport facilities in this area. Therefore, in all three the local 
taxi ranks in this township, new diesel-powered vehicles in good condition were introduced. 
Shelters were constructed for passengers to stand under during heavy rain or during the hot summer 
days and lavatories for the use of both the public and drivers were built. The township now boasts 
a taxi office where passengers can go and report their grievances. In this regard, positive and 
constructive transitions have taken place.  
 
  6.2.3 The role of political parties and their influence on perpetuating taxi violence. 
The research study, from the views of the participants, found that political parties did not have any 
influence on perpetuating taxi violence in the Mpumalanga area. It was, however, evident that 
perpetrators of this form of crime were known by the operators who also claimed that some 
community members were well aware who the culprits of the taxi wars were. Evidently, these 
perpetrators were stakeholders in the taxi industry. However, because the scope of this study was 
limited to eliciting the views of taxi drivers only, no conclusive conclusions may be drawn of the 
validity of these allegations. What could be determined was that the local Council member in the 
Mpumalanga township did not own taxis at the time of the study, and was therefore not a 
stakeholder in the local taxi association. However, should the local Councillor decide to purchase 
and operate a taxi in this township, the participants who were interviewed believed that this would 
result in political involvement and possible interference.  
 
6.2.4 The issues of taxi routes, rank space, poaching of passengers, poverty, low-salaries and 
greed as a vehicle for ongoing taxi violence  
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Some findings obtained in this research study revealed that, of the above-mentioned issues, only 
taxi routes, poaching of passengers and greed were identified as a vehicle for the ongoing taxi 
violence. Taxi owners in this industry were identified as being driven by greed in their efforts to 
‘hijack’ lucrative routes that do not belong to their association. The drivers also confessed to 
stealing other drivers’ passengers and this was identified as a contributing factor to taxi violence. 
Low salaries were identified as not having any impact on taxi violence as drivers got paid 
according to their carrying capacity as well as the nature of the employers they worked for. 
However, low salaries were a distinctive feature in the taxi drivers’ lack of vision for future 
opportunities in the taxi industry and in the desire of the majority of the respondents to leave the 
industry and make a living elsewhere. These study participants also revealed that if they worked 
for a stingy boss, they faced the misfortune of being underpaid, but if a boss was not greedy, a taxi 
driver even stood a chance of getting a bonus in December. Empirical data also facilitated the 
finding that taxi drivers were not the only people who were labeled in the industry (i.e., ruffians, 
careless, rude) but that taxi owners were labeled as well (i.e., greedy, cruel, stingy, instigating 
violence). Surprisingly, the taxi drivers labeled their employers as greedy, never satisfied, selfish, 
violent, and bad-tempered. This finding complies with the labeling theory which argues that the 
behaviour of certain individuals can be affected by the labels that are attached to them. This theory 
further argues that people are constantly aware of how they are judged by others through various 
social connections. Once an individual becomes aware of how he/she is being judged, the 
individual then starts acting in the way that he is perceived to be.    
 
6.2.5 The impact of taxi violence on drivers who were direct victims/witnesses to this form of 
violence 
This research study found that taxi violence affected the lives of drivers of minibus taxis 
psychologically, emotionally, mentally, financially as well as behaviourally. Some of the drivers 
lost focus during the day; they kept looking over their shoulders and wondered if they would make 
it home alive. They feared for their lives and those of passengers they transported. This put them 
in situations where they slept with one eye open and sometimes these situations forced them to 
carry illegal weapons to work. Taxi violence also had a great impact on their salaries. Taxis usually 
go on strike when violence erupts in this industry and this usually means that no taxis are allowed 
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to operate. Taxi drivers lose a lot of money during this time. Some drivers admitted that they 
sometimes became violent and irrational because of stress and fear, or that they became violent at 
home, with their co-workers, and with passengers. 
 
6.2.6 Coping strategies in times of taxi violence by drivers and community members 
The findings revealed that taxi operators dealt with this form of violence by obtaining and carrying 
illegal weapons such as firearms, pangas and knobkerries, just to name a few. These they used as 
a means of security and a coping strategy. They acknowledged that they would carry these weapons 
with them to the taxi rank at all times. Some weapons would be hidden inside their taxis in case 
they were attacked on the road. However, it was also revealed that when drivers were not fighting 
against one another, they defended themselves in groups against rival parties in the industry.  
 
6.2.7 Strategies that can be applied to curb taxi violence 
The drivers of minibus taxis also gave their own suggestions of what they felt would be suitable 
measures to deal with taxi conflicts that erupt as a result of taxi violence. These measures included: 
Government to intervene; permanent registration of drivers; a representative body for drivers such 
as a union for taxi drivers; and access to UIF, a provident fund and the provision of paid sick leave.  
Apart from the suggestions made by the drivers, additional recommendations based on the findings 
are outlined in the following section.   
 
6.3 Recommendations 
Having carefully considered the findings of this research study, the following recommendations 
are offered: 
 Strict rules/laws on the allocation of taxi routes. There is an indisputable need for an 
improved process of registering new routes, especially in areas where there have been new 
developments such as malls/shopping centers as well as new housing settlements. 
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Agreements should be made and recorded, clearly stating who is to ply which routes and 
the rest of the drivers should stick to their allocated routes. Such arrangements will put an 
end to situations where drivers fight for and contest lucrative routes 
 
 Education and skills training for drivers. Commuters of public transport, minibus taxis 
in particular, always complain about the manner in which drivers conduct themselves. This 
was evident in a study conducted by Sauti (2006) and also in the public comments made 
by a women’s organization on the 11th of November 1994 (KZNMT, 2000:2). Workshops 
for drivers of minibus taxis across the nine provinces should be implemented. Such 
workshops will educate them and provide them with skills training on how they should 
conduct themselves when offering their transport services to the public. These workshops 
should be compulsory for any permit applicant and should run on a regular basis so that 
substantive and improved results can be achieved. 
 
 
 Scrapping of old vehicles. Quality vehicles and service and the safety of commuters are 
often compromised as a large number of old minibus vehicles still operate on South African 
roads. Some passengers do not even reach their destinations due to accidents or vehicles 
breaking down. Government should establish new policies for phasing out old vehicles in 
exchange for the18- and-35 seater diesel powered vehicles in a way that will not affect the 
purchase cost of these new vehicles. Higher purchase prices will affect fare costs for 
commuters of minibus taxis. 
 
 Encouraging young entrepreneurs to join the minibus taxi industry. A large number 
of taxi owners are getting old; this was also evident on my visit to the Mpumalanga Taxi 
Association office. Younger owners can understand and cope better with the 
recapitalization and regulatory processes in the taxi industry. These young entrepreneurs 
with a background in business could compete in a more professional and organized manner 
without the instigation of violence.  
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 Limited number of taxi ownership by association members. There is a great need for a 
policy to be implemented that will indicate the maximum number of minibus taxis an 
individual is expected to own and the policy should bind them from exceeding that limit. 
Some drivers own ten taxis while others only own two or four. The one with ten taxis will 
use corrupt tactics to prevent other owners from adding a fifth or a sixth taxi to operate 
from a specific taxi rank. Such differences in the ownership of taxis have been identified 
as one of the major causes of taxi violence.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
An individual’s exposure to violence is not only limited to his/her home environment or his/her 
neighbouring community, but it is also important to be aware of the likelihood for violence on the 
routes that carry people between destinations.    
 The drastic increase in the incidents of violent taxi practices in South Africa is a result of numerous 
factors that are underpinned by the processes within transition politics. This finding is consistent 
with that of Abrahams (2010), whose research found that the dogmas of apartheid had bestowed 
supremacy and freedom on the White minority for years. His research further confirmed that this 
has resulted in the most detrimental eruption of political violence. South Africa is ranked high in 
the world for having unacceptable levels of crime and violence and it therefore comes as no 
surprise that its customs and traditions seem to perpetuate violence. High levels of violence remain 
a threat to society and distrust, suspicion and terror define many inter-personal relationships. South 
Africa is generally represented as a ‘miracle nation’ for the democratic freedom it has achieved; 
however, high levels of violence bear witness that true freedom has not been achieved because 
post-apartheid South Africa is not free of conflict. This finding is consistent with that of Dugard 
(2001:2) who argues that, as a country coming from a past that was plagued by violence and 
oppression, the country is still confronted with novel challenges that can be linked with the 
“dawdling ripening of democracy”. However, this empirical research study was different in a sense 
that it used two theoretical frameworks in order to understand how these violent conflicts erupt 
and why violent conflicts in the taxi industry continue to plague the South African minibus taxi 
industry. Other research studies on the same topic have not made this attempt.  
105 
There is therefore a need for further research to be conducted in urgent, continuing efforts to 
answer the following questions: Why do Government’s attempts to successfully deal with the 
minibus taxi industry and to restore relationships whose very nature has been proven to be 
contributory to the flaring up of conflicts, continue to fail? and What are the obstacles that stand 
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My name is Londeka Ngubane, I am doing a study entitled:  
“From ‘political wars to taxi violence’: Investigating the transition of taxi violence in a low-
income urban community in the Mpumalanga Township, South Africa”. 
 
Your participation in this study entails consenting to participating in the interview. The in-depth 
interview will run for approximately 1 hour -1 hour15 minutes and will be documented using an 
audio- recorder. Participation in this study is voluntary. You may withdraw at any stage and no 
negative consequences will be experienced. Apart from facilitating the discussion during the 
interview I will also take down notes which at a later stage will be transcribed and made 
available for data analysis. You will be expected to respond to the questions. Your participation 
will entail identifying and interpreting and giving your understanding of the root causes of taxi 
violence. 
Your participation in this study will contribute to understanding of issues relating to this form of 
violence and possibly find workable solution to put an end to this crime. Refreshments will be 
provided. Data collection will be treated with confidentiality and anonymity. The data collected 
will be stored in a safe location for a period specified by the university and pseudonyms will be 
used in order to protect your identity. Should you request, an electronic copy of the final project 
it will be sent to you on completion. 
 Willing  Not willing 
Audio equipment   
Photographic equipment   
Video equipment   
 
Thank you for you for your time 
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Your willingness to participate in this study will be greatly appreciated.  
Name of researcher: Londeka Ngubane                   Project Supervisor: Dr Sazelo Mkhize 
Contact Details:      084 248 9409                            Contact Details: mkhizes1@ukzn.ac.za 
 (email) ngubanelp@gmail.com  
Qualification for Project: Masters in Social Science  
University: University of KwaZulu-Natal 
School: Applied Human Sciences 
Criminology and Forensic Studies 
 I (Full name of participant) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this 
document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the 
research project. 
 
 I understand that I have the right to request that certain information disclosed during 
the group discussions remain confidential. 
 
 I understand that I am assured of anonymity. 
Please sign next to the dotted line stating whether you want to use your real name or false names. 
The investigator may use my real name……………………………………… 
I request that my real name be withheld ……………………………………... 
 
 I understand that I am liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I desire 
so. 
 
__________________                 _______________ 
 SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT                            DATE 
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APPENDIX A in IsiZulu 
INCWADI YESIVUMELWANO YOMSHAYELI WETEKISI 
Isihloko socwaningo: 
“From political wars to taxi wars”: Investigating the transition of taxi violence in a low-
income urban community in the Mpumalanga Township, South Africa. 
Researcher:   Londeka Ngubane 
Supervisor:    Dr Mkhize 
Discipline: Criminology and Forensic Studies 
School: Applied Human Science 
Phone: 031 260 1773 
Fax    : 031 260 7824 
 
ISINGENISO 
Igamalami ngingu Londeka Ngubane, umfundi owenza I Masters Kwi Department yakwa 
Criminology e University of KwaZulu-Natal, ngenza ucwaningo ngomthelela wodlame  embonini 
yamatekisi kanye nezinguquko esezenzekile kusukela ngo 1994 kuya ku 2015 .  Ngingathanda 
ukuzwa umbono wakho mayelana nodlame lwasembonini yamatekisi kanye nezinguquke 
osuzibonile zenzeka. Ngikhethe lendawo ngoba inomlando kanye nezigameko ezithinta udlame 
lwasematekisini. 
 
 INDLELA YOKWENZA 
Ukuze ngiqonde ngenqubo mpilo yakulemboni   kanye nangezimpilo zenu njengabantu abashayela 
amatekisi nsuku zonke , ngochitha isikhathi esingangehora nemizuzu engamashumi amathathu 
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ngivakahsela i-Rank yangakini. Lokhu kuzonginika ithuba lokuthi nginazi 
kangcono.Ngalesisikhathi ngizothanda ukukhuluma nani ngamunye ngamunye. Lokhu 
kungenzeka nganoma isiphi isikhathi emini  uma ningekho matasa.Ngizothanda ukuqopha 
lenkulumo kodwa uma kungenankinga. 
 
ILUNGELO LOKUVUMA NOKWALA  
Unelungelo lokukhetha ukuba yingxeye kanye nelungelo lokwala.Unelungelo lokwala ngaphambi 
kokuba kuqalwe nanoma sekuqaliwe  
 
UKUFIHLWA KWEMINININGWANE 
Konke okuqoshiwe kugcinwa endaweni ephephile e Nyuvesi yaKwa-Zulu Natali  kuphinde 
kulahlwe uma usuphelile umsebenzi wakho.Ngizoninikeza ngamunye ngamunye igama 
elizosetshenziswa ekubhalweni kwalomsebenzi.Lokho kwenzelwa ukuthu kungabibikho 
ozokwazi ukuthi lelophuzu noma lowombono washiwo ngubani. 
UKUVUMELANA 
Ngifundile ngaqondisisa lencwadi yesivumelwano, ngiyazikhethela ukuba yigxenye 
yalomsebenzi.Ngiyaqondisisa ukuthi akukho engizokuthola ngokuba yigxenye yalomsebenzi 
ngiyaqonda nokuthi akukho bungozi engizobhekana nabo ngokuba yigxenye yalomsebenzi.  
Ngiyaqondisisa futhi ngiyavuma ukuthi inkulumo phakathi kwami nomcwaningi iqoshwe. 
 
 
____________________  _____________________  _____ 
Taxi driver’s Name:    Signature    Date 
 
____________________  _____________________  ____ 





APPENDIX B in English 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
NAME: Londeka Ngubane 
PROJECT TITTLE: From ‘political wars to taxi wars’: Investigating the transition of taxi 
violence in a low-income urban community in the Mpumalanga Township, South Africa.  
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. What is your name? 
2. How old are you? 
3. What is your occupation? 
4. Where do you live? Tell me more about your area. 
5. What is your highest level of education? 
6. What made you join this industry? 
7. How long have you worked in this industry? 
8. In your opinion, has there been any development or transition in the Mpumalanga taxi 
association from 1994 to 2015? 
9. Do political parties have an influence on further perpetrating taxi violence? Please 
explain 
10. Do you think issues such as taxi routes, ranks, poverty; low salaries and greed all act as a 
vehicle for the ongoing taxi wars? Please explain 
11. If another opportunity existed elsewhere, would you take up that opportunity and leave this 
industry? 
12. What do you think is the biggest challenge facing this industry? 
13. What kind of developments and transition would you like to see in the taxi industry being 
implemented? 
14. What kind of problems do you often encounter in your dealings with : 
A.  Taxi owners? Please explain 
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B.  Taxi drivers? Please explain 
C.  Taxi association which you belong to? Please explain 
D. Your employer? Please explain 
 
15. What is the history of taxi violence in South Africa before and after the 1994 democratic 
elections? 
16. What do you believe to be the main cause of taxi violence? 
17. Who would you say are the major contributors/ perpetrators in the violence? 
18. Do you have concerns about your own safety as a taxi driver? If so, please explain 
19. In your opinion, how has the violence impacted the community? 
20.  In your opinion, what do you consider to be the solution to the violence in the taxi industry? 
Please explain 




















INTERVIEW SCHEDULE IN ISIZULU 
ISINGENISO 
Igamalami ngingu Londeka Ngubane, umfundi owenza I Masters Kwi Department yakwa 
Criminology e University of KwaZulu-Natali. Ngenza ucwaningo ngomthelela wodlame  
embonini yamatekisi kanye nezinguquko esezenzekile kusukela ngo 1994 kuya ku 2015. 
IMIBUZO 
1. Ungubani igama lakho? 
2. Uneminyaka emingaki? 
3. Isiphi isigaba semfundo owagcina kuso? 
4. Uhlalaphi? Ngichazele kabanzi ngendawo ohlala kuyo 
5. Isiphi isigaba semfundo owagcina kuso 
6. Iziphi izizathu ezakwenza waba yingxenye yalemboni? 
7. Ususebenze isikhathi esingakanani kulemboni? 
8. Ngombono wakho, ingabe zikhona izinguquko osuzibonile zenzeka kwiMpumalanga taxi 
association kusukela ku 1994 kuya ku 2015? 
9. Ngabe izinhlangano zepolitiki zinomthelela ekubhebhethekeni kodlame lwamatekisi? 
Ngicela ungichazele kabanzi. 
10. Ngokucabanga kwakho izinkinga ezifana nokubangwa kwemizila yamatekisi, izindawo 
zokurenka, indlala, imiholo engenelisi, nomona zonke ziyimbangela ekuqhubekeni 
kodlame lwamatekisi? Ngicela ungichazele kabanzi. 
11. Uma kungase kuvele elinye ithuba lomsebenzi kwenye indawo ungalithatha? Ngicela 
ungichazele kabanzi 
12. Uma ucabanga iyiphi ingqinamba enkulu lemboni yamatekisi ebhekene nayo? 
13. Iziphi izinguquko ongathanda ukuzibona zenzeka kulemboni? 
14. Iziphi izinkinga ojwayele ukuhlangabezana nazo uma uzibandakanya noma usebenzisana 
nalaba abalandelayo: 
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A. Abanikazi bamatekisi? Chaza kabanzi 
B. Abanye abashayeli bamatekisi? Chaza kabanzi 
C. Taxi association oyingxenye yayo? Chaza kabanzi 
D. Umphathi? Chaza kabanzi 
15. Uthini umlando wodlame lwamatekisi eNingizimu Africa emva kokhetho luka 1994 
nangaphambi kwalolukhetho? 
16. Ikuphi okholelwa ukuthi kuyimbangela nomthelela wodlame lwasematekisi? 
17. Ungathi ngobani ababhebhethekisi noma abagqugquzeli  baloluhlobo lodlame? 
18. Unakho ukwesabela impilo yakho njengomshayeli wamatekisi? Ngicela ungichazele 
kabanzi 
19. Ngokubona kwakho; loludlame seluwuhlukumeze kanjani umphakathi? 
20. Ngokubona kwakho, ucabanga ukuthi yini engaba yisisombululo ekulweni naloludlame? 
Ngicela ungichazele kabanzi 





APPENDIX C:   
Informed Consent Form For the University Counselor  
Title of Study: 
‘’From political wars to taxi wars: investigating the transition of taxi violence in a low-
income urban community in the Mpumalanga Township, South Africa.  
Researcher:   Londeka Ngubane 
School: Applied Human Sciences 
Phone: 031 2601773 
Introduction 
I am Londeka Ngubane, a Masters student from the Department of Criminology and Forensic 
Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, doing research on the transition of taxi violence. 
When undertaking a research study that involves human participants, consent has to be obtained 
from the individuals first. I would also like to request your presence during the interview session 
so that you can assist me should I encounter an even where taxi drivers might experience 
psychological trauma. However, you can raise any concerns and questions about the research 
before you agree, which I will address.  
Procedure  
Fifteen drivers of minibus-taxis will be selected for in-depth individual interviews with me. I will 
ask a few questions related to the above-mentioned topic. The interviews will be recorded and 
will be kept in strict confidence by my supervisor and no one else will have access to these tapes 
except my supervisor and me. 
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There will not be any direct benefits for the drivers and you. The results will enable us to 
understand the root causes as well as the transition of taxi violence. Their participation is 
voluntary and they are free to withdraw from the interview at any time without the fear of any 
negative or undesirable consequences to you. However if the driver shows signs of distress I will 
refer them to you. 
Authorization 
I have read and understood this consent form. I have been made aware that there will be no 
benefits for either the  taxi drivers or me. I have also been provided with the researcher’s contact 
details and those of the supervisor who can be easily contacted during office hours.  
____________________  _____________________  ______ 
Counselor’s Name:    Signature    Date 
 
____________________  _____________________  _________ 












To whom I may concern 
Request for Permission to conduct research 
My name is Londeka Ngubane, and I am a Criminology Masters candidate at the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal. The research I wish to conduct for my Masters Dissertation is titled“From 
‘political wars to taxi violence’: Investigating the transition of taxi violence in a low-income 
urban community in the Mpumalanga Township, South Africa”. This project will be 
conducted under the supervision of Dr Sazelo Mkhize, a Criminology lecturer at the University. I 
am hereby seeking your consent to approach a number of taxi operators in yout Association to 
provide participants for this project.   
 
Brief Objectives and hypothesis of the research  
Taxi wars in South Africa are often linked to the country’s history of political unrest as well as 
the policies of deregulation which were put in place by the apartheid government in the year 
1987. During those years, taxi wars were very few in figures and less criminal in nature. In the 
1980’s, taxi wars were also linked to political violence where the apartheid government further 
perpetrated this form of violence to keep the black people of African descent further divided. 
Dugard and Sekhonyane (2004) further explain “they (taxi operators) were divided by the … 
(apartheid government) and violence was encouraged” 
Taxi wars have now become more prevalent, more regionalized and criminal in nature. The 
governments control over the social order and the country’s economy declined during the 
period of the country’s transition. This has resulted in the informal organization of the taxi 
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industry where, ‘taxi associations have developed as informal agents of regulation, protection 
and extortion’, Dugard (2001). 
This research project has the following objectives: 
 To investigate the development and transition that has taken place in the 
Mpumalanga taxi association from 1994 to 2015.  
 To describe and analyze the history of taxi violence in South Africa before and 
after the 1994 democratic elections. 
 To investigate the role of political parties and their influence on further 
perpetrating taxi violence. 
 To find out if issues such as taxi routes, rank space, pouching of passengers, 
poverty, low salaries and greed all act as a vehicle for the ongoing taxi wars 
 
Upon completion of the study, I undertake to provide the Mpumalanga Taxi Association with a 
bound copy of the full research report. If you require any further information, please do not 
hesitate to contact me on 0842489409 emails 209516994@stu.ukzn.ac.za  or 
ngubanelp@gmail.com .Or you can contact my supervisor at 0840720086, 0312601773 email, 
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